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Migration and the Rural-Urban Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa

Beate Lohnert



July 2017

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The Centre for Rural Development (SLE) is affiliated to the Albrecht Daniel Thaer Institute for Agricultural and Horticultural Sciences in the Faculty of Life Sciences at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Its work focuses on four strands: international cooperation for sustainable development as a post-master degree course, training courses for international specialists in the field of international cooperation, applied research, and consultancy services for universities and organisations.

The objective of the research project “Towards a Socially Inclusive and Environmentally Sustainable Rural Transformation in Africa” is to identify strategies, instruments and measures that will help to forge a more socially inclusive and sustainable rural transformation in sub-Saharan Africa. The project itself is a constitutive component of the Special Initiative ONE WORLD, NO HUNGER financed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

The views and opinions expressed in this Discussion Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the BMZ and views of the SLE.

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Abstract

Sub-Saharan Africa is changing rapidly. A growing population, substantial economic growth in some parts, stagnation in others and a growing mobility are sustaining these changes. The differences between the urban and the rural are becoming increasingly blurred. One reason for a growing hybridity of “urban” and “rural” living is a highly mobile population that combines opportunities of many localities and evades risks through diversification. However, the diversity and multiplicity in urban and rural developments in and within the different countries of sub-Saharan Africa is to such an extent, that each case requires an individual analysis when it comes to policy formulation. In order to satisfy the diversity and change processes we will consider examples from three very different countries, wherever possible. Benin, a small, early urbanised coastal country in West Africa, Ethiopia, a late urbanised very large land-locked country in the Horn of Africa, and Zambia, a natural-resource based country with a very specific urban landscape, land-locked in Southern Africa have been chosen to resemble as many different and diverse developments in migration patterns, urban developments and rural-urban interactions.

Key words

Migration, sub-Saharan Africa, rural transformation, urbanisation, urban employment, multi-locality, environmental change

Summary

Urban Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Different Cities – Different Developments

In 2015, almost 472 million Africans lived in urban areas; sub-Saharan Africa will be 60–70% urban by 2050. However, the share of rural-urban migration as a factor of urban growth in sub-Saharan Africa has decreased. Africa's urban growth has not been accompanied by structural transformation and sufficient industrialization to absorb the growing workforce, leaving the majority of new jobs in the informal sector. With a growing urban population, rapid social changes are underway. Spatial segregation and socioeconomic polarization are reflected in urban fragmentation.

Building on historically strong economic and social links between rural and urban areas, temporary and circular migration are long-established components of African livelihoods. Sub-Saharan Africa's quantitative urbanisation today is mainly concentrated in smaller cities and towns with fewer than 300,000 inhabitants.

Although the rural population is projected to decline on a global level, many African countries are expected to experience significant rural population growth in the coming decades, in addition to urban population increases.

Benin's quantitative urbanisation is following the typical African and West African trend from a very small proportion of urban dwellers in the 1950s to a proportion of 42% to date, with an annual urbanisation rate of 4% over the past 15 years, and predicted to reach parity in the late 2020s.

Ethiopia is the least urbanized country in Africa. It is predicted to see a major increase in urban population from 2000 to 2050, when the rural population will still be in the majority. Nevertheless, Ethiopia is one of the most rapidly urbanizing countries in sub-Saharan Africa with a current average annual growth rate of up to 4%.

Zambia meanwhile also follows the African trend of urbanisation, but its quantitative urbanisation rate is above the East African average. For around 30 years however, Zambia showed an extraordinary increase in urban population, meeting the African trend again in the 2000s.

A small number of new towns and cities have been founded after independence. Most African governments have followed a policy of centralisation, with economic investments in existing urban areas. New City projects (planned urban areas on the periphery of an older city with provisions for residential, commercial, industrial and retail facilities) are very recent trends. There is not yet enough evidence to judge whether they are successful in terms of job creation, but for a limited time they can create jobs in the building and construction industry also for low-skilled workers.

Urbanisation processes as well as the political, socio-economic and planning environment in today's cities of sub-Saharan Africa are extremely heterogeneous, diverse, and volatile. This multiplicity makes generalisations difficult and one size fits all solutions almost impossible.

In the urban economies in Benin, Ethiopia and Zambia, most jobs are created in the informal sector, and urban youth unemployment and underemployment is particularly high. In Ethiopia, the building sector for houses and transport infrastructure has led to a fast-growing construction industry which accounts for a significant number of (short-term) jobs. The textile and leather sector in Ethiopia is growing and creating more jobs. Nearly half of the Zambian workforce is active in agriculture, forestry and fishing; in the urban areas this sector accounts for a third of the activities.

Housing (formal and informal) is the land consumer number one in the urban areas. Land consumption for the development of New Cities at the edge of the big cities is widely criticized as detrimental to peri-urban agriculture. In Addis Ababa, urban sprawl led to the conversion of croplands, forestland, and grasslands resulting in soil degradation, water pollution, agricultural community displacement, and the emergence of further informal housing.

Migration and employment

Theories on migration postulate an anticipated rise in “well-being” or at least income considerations as a necessary precondition for migration decisions. The theoretical approaches focus on different levels, and they differ in how they attempt to explain either the causes or the persistence of migration regimes.

Many empirical studies on migration show that even if disincentives seem to outweigh incentives, people still migrate, and vice versa. This means that predictions of migration processes based only on such considerations are bound to fail.

Migration and migration patterns are dynamic and change over time. So do the driving forces. Individual and group values and norms are subject to alterations. Security situations, world or regional economic crises or booms, extreme short term weather or physio-geographical events and longer term climate change processes all have impacts on local, regional and international migration processes. On a general level, all theories agree that the migration decisions involve weighing up costs and benefits. Most theories consider income considerations on different levels as one of the key factors influencing migration.

Migration is induced by various social, economic, political, cultural and environmental factors. Reviewing the literature on rural-urban migration, the prospect of finding work seems to be the most important reason. Often it is not wage-differentials that influence the decision but simply the opportunity to earn an income. Environmental change cannot easily be singled out from the other drivers of the decision to migrate and the empirical basis to relate migration directly to a changing environment is still weak.

From temporary to circular and permanent migration, from individual to the transfer of residence of whole extended families an entire bundle of different kinds and manners of migration are noticed. And all, hybrid and transitional migration is observed.

Circular migration typically is a repeated movement between origin and destination with substantial time spent in both places. It is the dominant type of voluntary movements in sub-Saharan Africa and recognized as one of the few means to transfer resources from core to peripheral areas.

Although some cities of sub-Saharan Africa still grow through rural-urban migration, it is often not the case that a steady group become urban residents. Rather a substantial number of migrants are living in bi- or multi-local households to enhance the chances of their kin to cope with their living conditions not only through monetary income generation but also by a spatial diversification of income production. Within the cities, new livelihood interrelations are created by the migrants, very often resembling ethnic islands which are fed by chain migration processes. Hybrid forms originate between rural, “ethnic-traditional” and modern, western urban lifestyles. The rural-urban contexture creates a liminal space of being in-between.

Meanwhile, multilocality and multiplicity of income generation has for many households in sub-Saharan Africa become the norm rather than the exception. The engagement of different household members in different sectors and in different locations has proved to be a working mechanism to cushion the effects of population growth and economic change.

The life between the “rural” and the “urban” and the ever-shifting hybridity of relations blurred the divide between cities and countryside. So-called “typical” place-based occupations have been de-placed. Some sort of agricultural activity is performed by around 50% of urban dwellers in sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition, improvements in transport infrastructure, and the growing importance of small and medium cities can also facilitate shorter-term and more temporary migration. Migrant practices often reflect density patterns and the quality of transport infrastructure.

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Abbreviations

AEO	African Economic Outlook
BMZ	<i>Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung</i> (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HDI	Human Development Index
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LSLA	Large scale land acquisitions
SLE	<i>Seminar für Ländliche Entwicklung</i> (Centre for Rural Development)

1 Urban change in sub-Saharan Africa

Many cities and towns of sub-Saharan Africa have been and are still subject to a high rate and rapidity of population increase. Only around 35% of sub-Saharan Africa is currently urbanized. While rural and urban populations in Africa will increase over the coming decades, the urban population increase is predicted to be more than twice as large as the increase in the rural population (United Nations, 2014), but with great variations. Zambia for example had already reached a 40% share of urban population in the 1980s to the 1990s, but afterwards urban population in certain areas (e.g. Copperbelt) even declined. Sub-Saharan Africa's population is expected to urbanize with a rapidity only exceeded by Asia. While it took Europe 110 years to increase the share of urban population from 15% in 1800 to 40% in 1910, Africa needed only 60 years to undergo the same quantitative transformation. In 2015, almost 472 million Africans lived in urban areas (AfDB et al., 2016: 147). The share of rural-urban migration as a factor of urban growth in sub-Saharan Africa has however decreased. While migration still accounted for at least half of all urban growth during the 1960s and 1970s, only about 25% of urban growth in the 1980s and 1990s was attributable to in-migration (AfDB et al., 2016: 154), with the largest proportion being due to natural population growth. Only 7 African countries (Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Lesotho, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, and South Africa) still attribute around 50% of their urban growth to migration (Potts, 2009; Tacoli, McGranahan and Satterthwaite, 2015). Deborah Potts (2013: 8), among others, argues that there is growing evidence that in many African countries urban-rural migration has increased in the wake of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the growing imbalances between urban workforce and urban job creation.

According to forecasts of UN organizations, sub-Saharan Africa will be 60–70% urban until 2050. The predicted doubling of urban population is very likely to go hand in hand with urban sprawl unless redirected into vertical growth. Urban sprawl has immense effects on the environmental conditions in the cities, caused by new housing (formal and informal), traffic and transport, and soil sealing – to name just a few. But urban sprawl also gives rise to a conversion of rural agricultural land in the rural-urban interface areas, pushing rural agriculture further away from the central urban markets. On the other hand, it can create opportunities for urban agriculture and urban gardening. The massive urbanization processes provoke potentially long-term negative impacts both on the environment as a whole and on the health of city dwellers. At the same time, severe and rapid social change processes are under way. Spatial segregation and socioeconomic polarization processes are reflected in urban fragmentation.

Building on historically strong economic and social links between rural and urban areas in sub-Saharan Africa (Lohnert: 2007a-d, Lohnert/Steinbrink: 2005), phenomena like temporary and circular migration are long-established components of African livelihoods. This has resulted in "strategic nomadism" which can lead in any direction (rural-rural, rural-urban, urban-urban, urban-rural) according to perceived advantages. People migrate for a whole number of reasons which can be sought in the conditions experienced and / or perceived in the sending areas as well as the receiving areas (see chapter 3).

Sub-Saharan Africa's quantitative urbanisation today is mainly concentrated in smaller cities and towns with fewer than 300,000 inhabitants (58% of the urban growth between 2000 and 2010

was observed in the smaller cities and towns), while cities with 300,000 to 1 million inhabitants account for 13% of urban population increase, and large cities with more than 1 million inhabitants for 29% (AfDB et al., 2016: 148). This means that people tend to migrate to smaller cities and only as second preference to the very large urban agglomerations. Observations over the past 30 years support the impression that the flow of rural-urban migration has been redirected to the smaller towns, together with an urban-urban migration from large to smaller cities. The major reason for this development lies in the declining quality of life for migrants in the big urban agglomerations, where they mainly find themselves living in marginalized and precarious conditions. In contrast to urban development in Europe, Africa's urban growth did not accompany structural transformation and sufficient industrialization to absorb the growing workforce. As a consequence, people have turned to jobs in the informal sector.

Although rural populations are projected to decline on a global level, many African countries are expected to experience significant rural population growth in the coming decades. The current population development of Niger gives reason to expect the largest rural population growth, tripling its rural population by 2050. And according to statistical projections, Uganda, Burundi, Zambia, Chad and Malawi will more than double their rural populations between 2014 and 2050. Nigeria is projected to see the largest absolute increase in rural population, adding 50 million rural dwellers between 2014 and 2050, followed by Ethiopia, with nearly 39 million new rural dwellers projected by 2050 (UN-DESA, 2015: 15).

Table 1: Ten countries with the largest projected increase in rural population between 2014 and 2050 and relative change in rural population			
Rank	Country	Projected increase in rural population 2014–2050 (thousands)	Relative change in rural population 2014–2050 (%)
1	Nigeria	50,157	53.0
2	Ethiopia	38,908	49.8
3	Uganda	37,991	116.1
4	Niger	29,737	196.8
5	Tanzania	25,776	73.5
6	DRC	21,181	52.6
7	Kenya	20,467	60.1
8	Malawi	14,646	103.7
9	Philippines	13,171	23.7
10	Sudan	13,020	50.6
Source: adapted from UN-DESA (2015: 15)			

1.1 Benin

Benin's quantitative urbanisation has followed the typical African and West African trend, with a very small proportion of urban dwellers in the 1950s developing to a proportion of 42% to date with an annual urbanisation rate of 4% for the past 15 years, reaching a predicted parity in the late 2020s.




Figure 1: Development and prospects of urban and rural population in Benin

Source: Created from UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Urbanisation Prospects (2014)

Cotonou is the economic hub and seat of government of Benin, with around 680,000 inhabitants. Porto Novo, the second largest city with a population of around 260,000 is the capital of Benin and nearly abreast as far as population size is concerned with the secondary cities of Parakou and Godomey. Rates of population increase for Cotonou and Porto Novo, at 0.18% and 1.5% increase per year (2002–2013) respectively, are far below the average natural population increase of Benin (2.7% per year). Even more striking is the difference to the mid-sized cities like Parakou (4.9%), Abomey Calavi (6%), and Ekpé with an average of 7.1% population increase per year between 2000–2013. These figures demonstrate that there has been a shift in the destination of rural-urban migration to the smaller cities and even a tendency of out-migration from Cotonou and Porto Novo. Both have very high density rates (around 8,600 inh./km² (2013) and 2,400 inh./km² (2013) respectively), indicating that space is scarce for new industrial and housing developments, pushing people either outside the urban boundaries and thus out of the enumeration areas or to other urban or rural areas. Additionally, both cities are restricted in their spread by topography.

1	Cotonou	679,012
2	Porto-Novo	264,320
3	Parakou	255,478
4	Godomey	253,262
5	Abomey-Calavi	117,824
6	Djougou	94,773
7	Bohicon	93,744
8	Ekpé	75,310





Figure 2: Population of the biggest cities in Benin (2015); Share of total urban population

Source: Created from City Population (2017)

1.2 Ethiopia

Ethiopia is the least urbanized country in Africa and is predicted to see its major increase in urban population from 2000 to 2050, although the rural population will still represent the majority. Nevertheless, Ethiopia is one of the most rapidly urbanizing countries in sub-Saharan Africa with a current annual growth rate of up to 4% on average.



Addis Ababa, with 3.2 million inhabitants, is the primary city of the country. It is the centre of politics, economy as well as social and material infrastructure, far larger than the next largest cities which have only around 300,000 inhabitants. The growth rate of Addis Ababa has been 2.2% per year (2007–2015), nearly matching the natural population increase of 2.5%. Addis Ababa has natural barriers to further excessive urban sprawl. The political and security situation, the housing crises and a saturated informal sector lead to further migration to the mid-sized cities. But investments into housing and infrastructure, e.g. 13 new universities have been built in the last years, also act as pull-factors to these towns (e.g. Nazret: 4.9%, Gondar: 5.7%, Bahir Dar: 5.7%, Mek'ele: 5.1% and Jima: 4.9% population increase per year between 2007–2015).




Figure 4: Population of the biggest cities in Ethiopia (2015); Share of total urban population

Source: Created from City Population (2017)

1.3 Zambia

Zambia also follows the African trend of urbanisation with an average annual growth rate around 3%, but lies above the East African quantitative urbanisation rate. For a period of around 30 years however, Zambia showed an extraordinary increase in urban population before conforming with the African trend again in the 2000s.




Figure 5: Development and prospects of urban and rural population in Zambia


Source: Created from UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Urbanisation Prospects (2014)

This is attributed to extraordinary high rural-urban migration rates from the 1950s to the end of the 1970s, after which it ceased to increase and in some cases even reversed due to urban-rural migration. This can be explained by various pull-factors, such as:

- High world market prices for copper, which fuelled the urban economies,
- The attraction of relatively high wages in the urban areas,
- Widespread urban consumer subsidies after independence: education, health care and other social service delivery,
- The lifting of restrictions on movement after independence,
- Heavy government involvement in key economic activities,
- The increase in public sector employment.

Today, Lusaka is the centre of government, commerce and infrastructure of the country and its population is four times bigger than that of the Kitwe, the second largest city. Already 52% of the urban population of Zambia live in Lusaka with an average growth rate of 4.9% per year, while the national average growth rate lies around 3.0%. Under the eight biggest cities, only the populations of Livingstone and Kitwe have been increasing by more than 3%.

All other bigger cities, especially the cities in the Copperbelt must either have lost population through out-migration or they have got a comparatively low percentage of families (e.g. annual population increase for Ndola: 1.9%, Chingola: 2.3%, Kabwe: 1.3%, Mufulira: 2.1%, Luanshya: 1.2% per year in the period 2000–2010).



1.4 Data and data collation

When drawing on population data from international bodies and national population statistics, various considerations have to be taken into account. Besides general imponderables associated with census surveys and data analysis, the comparability of population data is further complicated by the fact that definitions of “urban” and “rural” vary from country to country. Administrative

boundaries may also vary from time to time or may not be standardized among the different statistical units within a country. Most countries classify urban according to population size (“the threshold is between 1,500 to 3,000 inhabitants in 16 countries; 5,000 inhabitants in 11 countries; 10,000 inhabitants in 5 countries; 20,000 in Nigeria and 30,000 in Mali” AfDB et al., 2016: 147) or settlement structure, the share of non-agricultural activities, the presence of certain infrastructure, or according to political and administrative boundaries. Longitudinal studies and comparisons of crude data even within one country may also be complicated by the growth of rural settlements, so that these become reclassified as urban. All data used in this study have been cross-checked with different data sources according to plausibility considerations –however this does not eliminate the uncertainties as far as crude data are concerned.

1.5 Summary

- In 2015, almost 472 million Africans lived in urban areas, sub-Saharan Africa will be 60–70% urban by 2050.
- The share of rural-urban migration as a factor of urban growth in sub-Saharan Africa has decreased.
- Africa’s urban growth did not come along with structural transformations and sufficient industrialization to absorb the growing workforce, leaving the majority of occupations in the informal sector.
- With a growing urban population, rapid social change processes are underway. Spatial segregation and socioeconomic polarization processes are reflected in urban fragmentation.
- Building on historically strong economic and social links between rural and urban areas, temporary and circular migration are long-established components of African livelihoods.
- Sub-Saharan Africa’s quantitative urbanisation today is mainly concentrated in smaller cities and towns under 300,000 inhabitants.
- Although rural populations are projected to decline on a global level, many African countries are expected to experience significant rural population growth in the coming decades.
- Benin’s quantitative urbanisation has followed the typical African and West African trend with a very small proportion of urban dwellers in the 1950s developing to a proportion of 42% to date, with an annual urbanisation rate of 4% over the past 15 years, reaching a predicted parity in the late 2020.
- Ethiopia is the least urbanized country in Africa and is predicted to see its major increase in urban population from 2000 to 2050, but the rural population then will still be in the majority. Nevertheless, Ethiopia is one of the most rapidly urbanizing countries in sub-Saharan Africa with a current average annual growth rate of up to 4%.
- Zambia meanwhile also follows the African trend of urbanisation, but lies above the East African quantitative urbanisation rate. For around 30 years however, Zambia showed an extraordinary increase in urban population meeting the African trend again in the 2000s.

2 Different cities – Different developments

2.1 Classification of cities in sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa has a rich history of big agglomerations with substantial diversification. Most of the pre-colonial “towns” have their roots in trade and/or were founded as political centres, which then developed a diversified structure (e.g. Axum/Ethiopia or Timbuktu/Mali). Most of today’s cities and towns grew under colonial influence. Many of the towns served as ports to ship people as slaves to the Americas and then later to export cash crops and minerals. A relatively small number of cities have been founded since independence. These are the constructions of new Capital Cities and only recently New Cities. The following chapter seeks to give an overview of the diversity of history, developments, structures and functions of the urban areas in sub-Saharan Africa in order to clarify the unique character of each city. Despite the attempts to classify different cities into groups, it is nevertheless inevitable to look at the potentials and constraints of each city within its very specific frame conditions individually to be able to formulate sound and sustainable policies.

Colonial cities

Urbanisation of sub-Saharan Africa was shaped by the economics and political administration of the colonial powers. Export products like cash crops (e.g. cotton, coffee, tobacco, tea, etc.) and minerals were transported by railway to the harbour towns. Today the railway lines of Africa still largely reflect the infrastructural needs of the colonial economies. The administrations of the colonies were often situated either in harbour towns or at crossings of important transport lines, in or near existing settlements. Transport infrastructure was developed between the important economic or administrative cities, leaving other towns aside. These infrastructurally connected cities grew to relatively big agglomerations with industries, while at the same time no network of small and medium sized cities could develop. In the beginning, mainly men migrated from the rural areas to seek employment, leaving their families behind. Rural-urban work migration thus has a long history in sub-Saharan Africa. It was only in the mid-1990s that more and more whole families and women began to move to the cities.

After independence, most African governments followed a policy of centralisation, with a concentration of power in the capital cities. Non-agrarian investments followed this trend, leading to a general concentration of economic investments in urban areas.

Harbour cities

Harbour towns were developed during colonial times to export resources. All the cities of this origin are still more or less serving the purpose of transport nodes. Gradually, a food processing industry developed with processing of raw materials or tinning factories, as well as the installation of import substitution industries like breweries, production of fats and oils, etc. As local purchasing power developed, a domestic market emerged. New manufacturing and industries (leather, footwear, furniture etc.) followed to serve the needs of a growing city population. The majority of the African harbour cities underwent these developments more or less successfully in

terms of jobs and profit. The same applies for Porto Novo, the capital city of Benin as well as for Cotonou, the economic hub of the country.

The Harbour Town Porto Novo in Benin

In the 1600s, Porto Novo was settled by the Portuguese as a slave port, becoming the major West African slave port by the 18th century with a substantial number of Portuguese inhabitants. In 1960, Porto-Novo was declared capital city. It does not have an economic specialization. Small and mid-sized textile industries, livestock and fish trade as well as a large, mainly informal retail sector provide jobs. Extra-legal activities like hydrocarbons trading with neighbouring Nigeria are not to be underestimated and have detrimental effects on the ecosystem. Allio and Shut (2011: 35–36) describe economic activities in Porto Novo: "(...) Urban agriculture, crafts (blacksmithing, carpentry, woodworking, pottery, basketry) are also an important part of today's economy. Major industrial activities are largely unrepresented in the area and register only 5% of economic activities. The major units that exist in the area include a soap factory (IBCG), a production plant Nina wick and fuse, a large-scale printer of school books, a few bakeries, foundries and industrial processing units of agricultural products. (...)". Because of its location on the edge of the lagoon, the city of Porto Novo has always been characterized by strong fishing activities, complemented by fish farming in brush pens (the *acadja*). Coastal erosion, aggravated by a sand winning industry that provides raw material for a growing building sector, however threaten the periphery of the city and thus the income sources of fishermen and the protein sustenance of the population that engages in subsistence fishing.

Mining cities

Completely new settlements were founded based on the discovery of precious minerals, like Ndola and Kitwe in the Copperbelt in Zambia and Johannesburg and Kimberley in the gold and diamond mining areas of South Africa. The economies of cities that are based on the exploitation of natural resources are generally very vulnerable. Changes in world market prices can lead to unemployment, reduction of revenues and a general decline of the whole city economy. A significant decline in spending capacity will inevitably lead to a slump. To cushion such a development, diversification of the economies of these cities is imperative.

The Mining Town Kitwe in Zambia

Kitwe in Zambia owes its existence to the copper mining industry. It went through at least two crises induced by falling world market prices. World economic depression in the 1930 and the recent deterioration of the copper price together with prevailing severe electricity shortages resulted in a large number of job losses in the mining sector of Zambia, hitting the mining cities especially hard. Mining of copper and cobalt is the central income source of the

population in and around Kitwe. Previously, Kitwe had attracted many unskilled men to work in the mines. When in the years 2000 organizations in the mining sector that were run by the mining parastatal Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) were closed due to a privatisation policy, the new investors outsourced several services, previously provided by ZCCM. At the time, ZCCM was also responsible for public and social services. Hospitals and public schools now charge fees for services that had previously been free of charge for all the mining employees and their families.

Simpere (2010: 15) states that: "Privatization has, moreover, been accompanied by massive employee layoffs. In 1991, despite the crisis in the sector, 56,582 people were still employed by the mines. The government however had to implement a large-scale retrenchment programme to prepare the sale of the sector, and in 1997 only 31,000 employees were left in the mines. After privatization, new social plans cut this figure further: in 2004, the year preceding the EIB (European Investment Bank) loan, the Zambian mines had no more than 19,900 workers."

On the other hand, the Kitwe Urban Profile by UN-Habitat (2009) describes the mining sector as having improved after privatisation and as having offered a range of chances for small-scale entrepreneurs: "The mining sector has improved following privatisation and an injection of fresh capital. Quarrying for industrial minerals like laterite, gravel, and sand for building is another form of mining being practiced in some parts of the city. Other than the large-scale operations associated with road construction projects, such quarrying is small-scale and informal, carried out by residents in locations rich in these resources" (Habitat, 2009:12). The engagement of small-scale mining for building absorbed some of the unemployed miners. Others turned to petty-trade or went back to the rural areas. The shut-down of production in the Mopani mining complex by the Glencore company in 2015 due to "modernisation" again led to the loss of more than 4,000 jobs. Kitwe has 21 informal settlements with little or no basic service infrastructure; most of these are not recognized by the municipality and are thus in danger of being demolished at any time.

Planned Cities

Except for the establishment of the seaport of Tema in Ghana, most of the planned cities after independence were designed as new capital cities. However, none of them could fulfil the expectations as they lacked a historically evolved function of centrality for their hinterland and the whole country. Cities like Abuja (Nigeria), Lilongwe (Malawi), and Dodoma (Tanzania) hardly developed any original economy except for their administrative function and the services provided for the employees. On the contrary, in the evening many flee the deserted cities. An interesting case is Yamoussoukro. Houphouët-Boigny, then President of Côte d'Ivoire, relocated the parliamentary seat to his former home village and built there one of the biggest churches worldwide. But neither Yamoussoukro nor Dodoma ever gained the intended importance, leaving Abidjan and Dar es Salaam as the de facto capital cities of their countries. It could also be argued that these new developments swallowed up investments that the de facto capital cities would have dearly needed. Prestigious new capital cities have been built with an enormous input of

money and planning efforts while the actual socio-economic, political and educational centres were neglected and even deprived of support.

New Cities

New City projects are a very recent development trend in the African urban landscape. New Cities are planned urban areas on the periphery of an older city with provisions for residential, commercial, industrial and retail facilities. A prominent example for this type of urban planning is Nova Cidade de Kilamba, some 30 kilometres outside Luanda (Angola), which was built by a state-owned Chinese investment company under an oil-for-infrastructure arrangement. Between 2011 and 2014, most of the 25,000 apartments designed for more than 200,000 inhabitants stood empty: the apartments were too expensive for the slum dwellers of Luanda, while most of those who would have been able to afford the prices preferred to stay near the central business district.

Approximately sixty kilometres outside Nairobi, Konza Technology City¹ is planned to become a world-class technology hub. The “Silicon Savannah” is designed to host a technology park, science park, university campus, international business district and other commercial and residential properties. The assumption behind the development is that it will be possible to convince international firms to outsource part of their IT services there. The economic development in Bangalore was a model. Appolonia, a development outside Accra is advertising as follows: “Appolonia is a Rendeavour master planned development, designed to suit your lifestyle. Whether it’s to live in one of our unique residential developments or to work within the neighbouring business park, you will be sure to find a serene and well-planned space dedicated to your lifestyle” (Appolonia City project homepage).

In Lusaka, Roma Park a designated residential and commercial project is built on 118 hectares as a greenfield development. The Lusaka Voice could head an article on 27 April 2015: “Roma Park residential plots sold out”. But it continues: “Despite the success in selling the residential plots, the park is still grappling with the sale of commercial and industrial plots. Sales and marketing manager Muzingo Banda said all the residential plots at the industrial park had been sold out due to the locality of the park (...)” (Lusaka Voice, 2015).

As experience with many other greenfield developments shows, infrastructure alone is not enough for the attraction of business and the creation of jobs. Nevertheless, for a time this type of investment can create jobs in the building and construction industry also for low-skilled workers, provided that international building companies do not use imported manpower, as some of the Chinese state-owned construction companies do.

Refugee Camp “Cities”

Recurrent crises and conflicts led to an enormous increase of internally displaced people as well as inter-African refugee movements all over sub-Saharan Africa. In many cases, internally displaced people will flee from rural areas to cities and towns to seek protection and support, establishing camps on the outskirts of big cities and towns. Besides environmental and social problems caused by unplanned and unregulated influx of people to the outskirts of urban agglomerations

1 Nairobi Planning Innovations Homepage

due to the failure of preventive and emergency policies, conflicts and contestations with the autochthonous population over resources are inevitable.

A prominent and remarkable example is Dadaab camp in Kenya. Dadaab refugee camp was established in 1991 for people fleeing clan fighting in Somalia. Dadaab had been a small village with around 800 inhabitants, but now the camp, initially established as a temporary solution near the Kenyan-Somalian border, has 350,000 inhabitants according to official figures, other sources talk of 500,000 people living there. Over the years, Dadaab has developed into the third largest agglomeration in Kenya after Nairobi and Mombasa with bakeries, shops, and even cinemas. One of the reasons for this growth is the Kenyan policy of not allowing any refugees to settle outside designated camps. The environmental and economic impacts of supposedly temporary camps without proper infrastructure are apparent: rings of deforestation caused by the energy needs of the inmates, loss of agricultural land, and groundwater pollution to name just a few.

Ghost towns

While most of the cities and towns in sub-Saharan Africa are growing, some have lost importance and population turning them into “ghost towns”. There are various reasons why the settlements are abandoned.

The Ghost Town Dallol in Ethiopia

Dallol, situated in the Danakil desert in the Afar Triangle, was founded in the 1910s as a mining town near a railway line to the port of Mersa Fatma. Until after World War I, potash mining for export to Europe continued. As the deposits in Dallol are on the surface, mining was possible with low-tech facilities. While the cost of extraction in other parts of the world fell and artificial fertilizers were developed, Ethiopian salt was no longer competitive. After World War II, the railroad was removed by the British and Dallol was left without connection to any transport infrastructure. Large-scale mining has never been taken up due to lack of transport infrastructure, foreign competition, a hostile environment (Dallol is said to be the hottest place on earth) and political conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Dallol became a ghost town. But today some hundreds of small scale miners transport salt blocks from the Danankali by camel or donkey to be sold in Berahile some 70 km away. Tourism also generates some income.

Mining ghost towns are found in Namibia (Elizabeth Bay, Kolmanskop, Pomona) and South Africa (Millwood near Knysna or Leydsdorp near Tzaneen). Other towns became uninhabited when they lost their main function. Grand Bassam for example, formerly the capital of Côte d'Ivoire, lost its economic activities and subsequently its population after it had been abandoned by the French Colonial Government.

The urbanisation processes and the political, socio-economic and planning environment in today's cities of sub-Saharan Africa are extremely heterogeneous, diverse, and volatile. This makes generalisations difficult and one size fits all solutions almost impossible.

2.2 The urban transition in sub-Saharan Africa

African urbanisation is characterized by a wide diversity of processes and situations. As far as the combination of economic and demographic factors as well as urbanisation processes are concerned, African countries could fall into five categories: diversifiers, early urbanisers, late urbanisers, agrarian countries, and natural resources-based countries. They are generally distinguished by their urbanisation rate, the fertility transition and the structural transformation. Structural transformation is represented by the changing role of agriculture and the (changing) importance of natural resources. The African Economic Outlook (AEO) 2016 arranges the African countries according to the above-mentioned criteria.

Two countries in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa and Mauritius, are classified by the AEO 2016 as diversifiers. They have in common that their urbanisation levels are between 40% and 67%, their total fertility ratios do not exceed three children per woman, and they have the highest gross national incomes in Africa (GNI above USD 10,000 /pp), and an HDI Index value of above 0.6. While in all countries the service sector has increased over the past ten years, the manufacturing sector has declined since its peak in the late 1980s to early 1990s. AEO (AfDB, 2016: 156) believes: "The main challenge for these countries is to increase both productivity and economic complexity, as they have not yet been able to transition to sophisticated manufacturing."

The seven countries classified as early urbanisers include Benin. They are at a rate of 35–50% urbanised and have total fertility ratios of approximately five children per woman. They are classified as low to lower-middle income countries (GNI of USD 1,000–4,000 /pp), and their HDI index value varies between 0.40 and 0.57. All early urbanisers are situated along the West African coast, sharing a common history of trading to the seafront. From independence until 2010, migration away from agriculture as well as natural population increase were responsible for their urban growth. The manufacturing sector provides between 2% and 14% of GDP and is not able to absorb increasing unskilled migrant labour; the urban informal services sector grew significantly. AEO (AfDB, 2016: 156): "The common challenge for these early urbanisers is to break into higher value activities, particularly in the urban formal sector. They should focus on manufacturing that can absorb a low-skilled labour force, pursue ambitious education policies, develop higher value-added urban services, further raise agricultural productivity and continue their demographic transition."

Late urbanisers are characterized by a dominant rural sector, having started their urbanisation only recently. This is characteristic for many East African countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania. Roughly 30% are living in cities and towns, the average Gross National Income (GNI) is USD 1,000–3,500 /pp, total fertility rates are four to six children per woman, the HDI value lies between 0.38 and 0.54. Between 4–12% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in late urbanising countries is generated by manufacturing. According to the AEO (AfDB, 2016: 157): "These are the main challenges for the late urbanisers: continue to improve their infrastructures, particularly transportation linking different urban growth centres, break into manufacturing and higher value services as they continue to move out of agriculture, urbanise, and accelerate their demographic transition. Developing a network of intermediary cities can support the rapid urbanisation that is currently taking place."

In agrarian countries, less than a third of the population is urban and the total fertility rate is on average at least six children per woman. The GNI is below USD 1,900 /pp and their HDI values are between 0.48 and 0.34. Economies are agriculture-based with rates of 25–58% contribution to the GDP, while manufacturing contributes only 4–12%. In these countries, natural population increase was the main driver of urban population growth between 2000 and 2010. Here, rural-urban migration is expected to increase over the next 10–20 years in addition to a high natural population growth.

The AEO states (AfDB, 2016: 157): “The agrarian countries are challenged to begin the structural transformation process more decisively by raising agricultural productivity and engaging in a well-planned urbanisation process. Once they have accelerated structural transformation, they will likely start the fertility transition.”

The natural resources-based countries owe their urbanisation processes to a large extent to the jobs being created through the exploitation of natural resources. Compared to other countries with a similar income range (USD 500–20,000 per capita), these countries show higher urbanisation rates (40–78%) and higher fertility rates. Natural resource based counties are characterized by a capital city or an economic hub which displays the typical features of socio-economic urban primacy, being disproportionately larger than other cities, e.g. Lusaka. “Their common challenges are to use their competitive advantage in international trade to diversify their economic base away from natural resources and to decrease fertility particularly in urban areas. However, they currently need specific policies to face the adverse global conditions of lower commodity prices” (AfDB, 2016: 157).

Table 2: African countries grouped according to levels of structural transformation

Non-resource-based				Natural resource-based
Diversifiers	Early urbanisers	Late urbanisers	Agrarians	
Advanced fertility transition, urbanised	Fertility transition started, urbanising	Fertility transition started, not (yet) urbanising	Neither fertility nor urban transition	
Egypt	Benin	Eritrea	Burkina Faso	Algeria
Mauritius	Cameroon	Ethiopia	Burundi	Angola
Morocco	Côte d’Ivoire	Kenya	Chad	Botswana
South Africa	Ghana	Madagascar	C. A. R.	Rep. Congo
Tunisia	Liberia	Mozambique	Malawi	D.R.C.
	Senegal	Rwanda	Mali	Guinea
	Togo	Sudan	Niger	Libya
		Tanzania	Sierra Leone	Mauritania
			Uganda	Nigeria
				Somalia
				South Sudan
				Zambia
				Zimbabwe

Source: adapted from AfDB (2016: 157)

The classification of countries along the line of their urbanisation rate, fertility rate and change from agricultural based income can give a first insight into urban processes in Africa. But as with all generalisations, the diversity of countries, regions and localisations are not sufficiently considered. Along with urbanisation, almost all African countries are experiencing a shift from the agricultural to the services sector as far as their proportionate contribution to the GDP is concerned.

2.3 Urban economies in Benin, Ethiopia and Zambia

For rural-urban migrants, living in a city requires at least a job to survive and a place to live. Precarious housing not only jeopardizes the health of the inhabitants and creates environmental problems but also has a big impact on the national economy. Housing prices and prices for building materials can therefore be a good indicator for a comparison of income in urban and rural areas and for the living expenses in the cities. The Africa Housing Finance Yearbook 2015 provides data on this issue. Otherwise statistical data are published regularly by the national statistical institutions on various aspects concerning the economy. However, the same caution applies as with data on population, because definitions might be different and issues like under-employment, unpaid work by family members or self-employment in a rural subsistence environment might be appraised differently.

Benin

In a city of Benin, the cheapest housing unit would cost approximately USD 15,000 and 19.6% of all urban households can afford this (CAHF, 2016: 15). The affordability of housing is worsened by the escalation of land prices and speculation. Lower and middle income groups have been forced to move further from the inner cities to find affordable land, adding to urban sprawl. The price increase of construction materials is a further strain.

The *Enquête Modulaire Intégrée sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages* (EMICoV, 2011), carried out by the National Statistical Institute of Benin offers insights into rural-urban comparisons of living conditions, making special reference to Cotonou (see Table 3).


According to the representative household survey of the National Statistical Institute of Benin (INSAE: 2012), the employment rate is higher in rural areas than urban areas: 75.2% of the rural workforce aged 15 to 64 years have employment against 66% in urban areas in 2011. In Cotonou, the employment rate rose from 57.1% in 2006 to 68.6% in 2010 and stabilized at 68.0% in 2011.

Of the labour force in the agriculture and food sector, more than 70.0% have no formal school education. There are very few workers with upper secondary school education in the agricultural sector. In the services sector, people with a variety of skill levels are employed. In the building construction-materials sector, 28.7% are not educated, 40.9% completed primary level, 5.6% are skilled labourers.

Jobs are created mostly in the informal sector: nine jobs in ten fall under the notion of “informal”. 95.0% of employed women work in the informal sector against 85.5% of men. Women are less present in the public sector (1.9%) than in the formal private sector (3.1%). In contrast, 7.6% of employed men work in the public sector and 6.9% in the formal private sector.

Table 3: Distribution of employment by place of residence and socioeconomic characteristics in Benin (%)					
Socio-economic characteristics	Place of residence				
	Cotonou	Other urban	All urban	Rural	Total
Sex					
Male	46.5	49.5	48.6	46.8	47.6
Female	53.5	50.5	51.4	53.2	52.4
Level of education					
No formal education	22.4	49.2	40.8	74.1	60.0
Primary	32.7	25.3	27.6	17.8	21.9
Secondary 1	22.6	15.3	17.6	6.0	10.9
Secondary 2	10.4	5.6	7.1	1.5	3.9
Higher education	11.9	4.6	6.9	0.6	3.3
Employment sector					
Agriculture	1.3	25.7	18.0	58.1	41.1
Cotton, textile	6.8	6.6	6.6	4.7	5.5
Logistics, trade	42.6	28.1	32.7	16.5	23.4
Agri-food	2.6	5.4	4.5	5.3	5.0
Construction and public works – construction materials	5.0	3.9	4.2	2	2.9
Culture and tourism	12.5	7.0	8.8	4.5	6.3
Other industrial and artisanal activities	9.0	9.4	9.3	4.7	6.6
Other services	20.2	13.9	15.9	4.2	9.2
Age					
15–19	5.8	7.3	6.8	9.3	8.2
20–24	11.0	10.7	10.8	11.1	11.0
25–34	34.5	32.9	33.4	29.6	31.2
35–59	46.4	45.9	46.1	45.2	45.6
60–64	2.2	3.3	2.9	4.9	4.0
Source: adapted from INSAE (2011)					

There is a great disparity by place of residence regarding the type of employment. The formal sector dominates in Cotonou, with 26.0% of employees working in this sector, compared to 18.1% in the other urban areas. Less than 5% of the workforce in rural areas are formally employed. The service sector is the most formalized, with half of the employed workforce in the formal sector. Among those employed in the building-construction materials division, 10.6% work in the private formal sector and 87.3% in the informal sector. But the majority of houses built by individuals are the result of individual and informal construction companies. Construction is booming but employs predominantly informal and seasonal labour. In trade and logistics, 8.7% of employees work in the formal private sector and 2.2% in the public sector. Nearly all (99.5%) in agriculture are working under informal conditions.



Pluri-activity

Pluri-activity is one the strategies adopted by workers to increase their income. In many cases this results from a situation of underemployment or precariously paid main job. In 2011, 15.0% of employees had at least one secondary activity. The rate of multiple jobs is 16.9% for men against 13.2% in women. Multi-activity increases with age and is more common in rural areas (18.7%) than in urban areas (9.9%, including 5.2% in Cotonou). Multiple activities also go hand in hand with a lower level of education: the rate is 16.5% for the uneducated workers, 14.4% for primary school education and around 10% for higher education (EMICoV, 2011: 23).

Ethiopia

As most urban jobs in Ethiopia are created in the informal sector, financing of new housing is difficult. Only upper income groups and members of the diaspora can afford housing built by the private sector. The cheapest formally built dwelling is estimated to cost around USD7,397 and 35.9% of the urban population are said to be able to afford this (CAHF, 2016: 18).

In Ethiopia, land is owned by the state. Municipalities are in charge of urban land and regional governments of rural land. Leasehold tenure is applied in urban areas, while in rural and peri-urban areas there is a permit system based on use rights. The application of two different legal systems frequently cause conflicts, especially in fast growing cities where many newcomers settle at the outskirts of the city. Around Addis Ababa, several cases could be witnessed where former rural land was sold by the agrarian usufructs to unaware migrants who built a house there.

Table 4: Employment generation of the construction industry from 2010/11–2014/15 in Ethiopia									
Type of employment	Type of infrastructure development								Total
	Road	Railway	Power gen.	Housing	City Infra.	Sugar	Fertilizer factory	Irrigation and dam	
Engineers	8,360	5,000	1,074	2,958	1,938	780	420	6,543	20,530
Associate engineers	13,268	25,000	2,686	11,832	7,750	8,988	3,400	7,305	72,924
Operators & technicians	13,290		3,761	1,479	969	500	200	100	20,199
Construction foreman	3,605		3,223	20,706	13,563	3,000	1,800	437	45,897
Occupational (mason, carpenter...)	8,567		32,129	35,496	23,251	7,000	4,980	6,100	111,423
Other occupational	7,798			1,479	969	210	200	216	10,656
Day labourers	309,461	329,250	75,368	87,904	21,056	42,000	19,000	26,905	884,039
Total	364,349	359,250	118,241	161,854	69,496	62,478	30,000	47,606	1,165,668
Source: adapted from Kiburu (2012: 10)									

A recent boom in the building sector for houses and transport infrastructure has led to a fast-growing construction industry, which accounts for a significant number of jobs. However, as the building sector is especially dependent on economic trends and in the case of Ethiopia on foreign direct investments and aid transfers, job creation in this sector is volatile.

According to the Ethiopia Urbanization Review (World Bank, 2015), the cities in Ethiopia account for 38% of the GDP but they only employ 15% of the workforce of the country. However, between 2005 and 2011 2.8 million new jobs were created in Ethiopia, 60% in urban areas. Generally, the large cities in Ethiopia are characterized by lower employment rates than smaller towns, because employment in smaller towns is more oriented towards primary activities, as well as to the hotel and restaurants sector.

Kiburu (2012: 10f.), referring to the latest Urban Employment/Unemployment Survey in Ethiopia (UEUS, 2011) states that around 50% of the urban population in Ethiopia is in employment, 75% of them are active in three major sectors: services, shop and market sales workers, elementary occupations and craft and related activities. Professionals and senior officials accounted for 16% of the total employed urban population of the country. The majority of the urban employed population are engaged in the service sectors (hotel and restaurant, public administration, private households; education, health and social work; extra-territorial organizations; financial intermediation, electricity, gas and water supply and real estate). 21% of the employed population are active in wholesale and retail trade, while manufacturing, mining, and quarrying and construction industrial divisions account for 21% of the employed population of urban areas in Ethiopia. Occupations in the primary sector like agriculture, forestry or fishing contributed little to the creation of employment in the urban areas. Regarding the employment status, around 40% are self-employed, ca. 20% by private companies and organisations, while government or parastatal employees account for another 21%. Unpaid family workers accounted for 50% nationally, but only 15% in urban areas. The informal sector is the main source of urban employment, here especially domestic work, trade, services in hotels and restaurants etc.

As in many other countries in Africa, urban youth unemployment is particularly high (LSE, 2012). The World Bank study (2007) on urban labour markets in Ethiopia indicates a similar problem to that discussed for Benin: widespread underemployment, especially in the informal sector and among the youth. Underemployment leads to low incomes in the informal sector. Asked if they are available and ready to work longer hours, more younger and more males are answering with yes.

Generally, Ethiopia's manufacturing export profile is dominated by traditional products such as semi-processed leather and skin. The leading manufacturing export product groups are leather, textile and garments, footwear, prepared foods, and chemicals (e.g. animal vaccines and sulphuric acid). The textile and leather sector are however in an ascending process creating more jobs, as UN-Habitat (2014: 14) states that: "This is already beginning to happen as we recently witnessed the relocation of Chinese and Swedish textile manufacturers to Ethiopia. Already Ethiopia is cost competitive with China in the textile and leather sectors."

Table 5: Trends in employment (% of total manufacturing employment), 2000–2011, Ethiopia											
Sector	00/01	01/02	02/03	03/04	04/05	05/06	06/07	07/08	08/09	09/10	10/11
Food and beverages	29.1	25.4	30.1	29.8	29.0	30.1	28.6	31.3	30.2	32.5	38.7
Non-metallic minerals	8.0	8.4	7.7	8.7	8.3	8.5	8.9	12.8	13.3	10.5	9.9
Tanning and leather	7.5	6.8	7.1	7.3	7.2	6.7	6.7	6.5	5.9	5.8	8.1
Textiles	25.8	22.6	21.6	21.7	19.0	18.7	17.4	9.2	12.1	11.6	7.7
Rubber and plastic	3.6	4.4	4.4	4.2	5.2	5.8	6.1	6.6	8.0	7.5	6.3
Paper and printing	5.9	6.2	6.3	6.6	6.9	6.8	6.6	6.8	5.9	5.4	5.8
Chemicals	4.3	5.1	5.0	4.8	5.5	4.8	5.6	5.9	5.4	6.0	5.6
Furniture	4.6	5.4	5.0	4.9	8.0	4.8	4.6	5.4	5.3	4.5	3.7
Fabricated metal prod.	2.8	2.8	3.4	3.3	3.5	4.9	2.8	3.9	4.0	5.4	3.5
Apparel	4.0	3.8	4.2	3.6	2.4	3.5	6.1	5.8	5.2	5.0	3.3
Basic iron and steel	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.5	1.0	1.1	2.2	2.8
Wood products	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.6	2.4	1.4	1.8	2.3
Vehicles	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	2.5	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.9
Tobacco	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.8	0.5	0.8
Machinery and equipment	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Source: adapted from AfDB (2014: 22)											

Zambia

Zambian urban households spend a considerable proportion of their income on housing, and here mainly on rentals. The monthly rent for a three-bedroom unit ranges from USD 350 to USD 500 (CAHF, 2016: 248). Households in Zambia spend 40–50% of their income on rentals (CAHF, 2016: 248). The housing problem of Zambia is of qualitative and quantitative nature. The mining cities of the Copperbelt and Lusaka face the main quantitative housing backlog. More than 50% of the dwellings in Zambian towns are informal. The cheapest formal housing unit in a Zambian city costs approximately USD 65,000, but only 3.8% of the urban population would be able to

afford this (CAHF, 2016: 26). Before the liberalisation reforms of the 1990s, housing had to be provided as part of an employment contract by law. The mining houses in the Copperbelt cities are a good example for this linking. Since privatisation and liberalisation, each household has been responsible for its own housing, putting an additional burden on income generation and leading to a further informalisation of the housing stock.

Most Zambian urban centres tend to depend on one or two dominant economic activities. Mining towns and small provincial towns are highly specialized as far as their economic base is concerned. They are either dependent on mining or on large firms (e.g. sugar in Mazabuka, coffee in Kasama, and cotton in Chipata). The most diversified urban economy can be found in Lusaka. Many small towns are also dependent on the service sector. However, Livingstone is an example of a fairly diversified economy. Here, administration, manufacturing of textiles, agro-processing (e.g. beverage production and manufacturing) as well as tourism contribute to the urban job market.

The Zambia Labour Force Survey, 2014, published by ZAMSTATS gives some information on the urban economies in Zambia: Only 22% of the Zambian workforce are employed and paid for their work. Nearly 39% of the urban workers are paid employees, in contrast to 10.5% in the rural areas. Most of the unpaid work in the rural areas is done by self-employed persons and by family members. Roughly 41% of the working population are self-employed, of these 51% in the rural areas, mainly as farmers on their own land (some work as informal miners). In urban areas, 29% are self-employed, mainly in the informal trade and service sector. Contributing family workers make up for 38% of the workforce in rural areas and 31% in urban areas.

Table 6: Percentage distribution of employed persons (15 years or older) by status in employment Rural/Urban, Zambia (2014)			
Status in employment	Total employed persons (%)	Rural (%)	Urban (%)
Paid employees	22.3	10.5	38.6
Apprentices	0.1	0.1	0.2
Interns	0.1	0.0	0.1
Employers	0.4	0.3	0.4
Self-employed	41.4	50.7	28.8
Volunteers	0.4	0.4	0.4
Contributing family workers	35.3	38.1	31.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Source: adapted from CSO (2014)			

Regarding the sector of employment, nearly half of the Zambian workforce is active in agriculture, forestry, and fishing; even in the urban areas this sector accounts for a third of the jobs. Three percent of the urban employees are active in mining and 5.7% in manufacturing. Wholesale, retail and vehicle repairs provides more than 20% of urban jobs, while the construction industry are done by 5.3%.

Underemployment is also a crucial factor for Zambia. Skilled male agricultural, forestry and fisheries workers have an underemployment rate of 14.5% while 17% of female craft and related trade workers were underemployed.

Of all the rural and urban employed, 83.9% were active in the informal sector, with a female rate of 91%. The rates differ strongly between urban and rural areas: 92% of the employed persons in the rural areas were in the informal sector, contrasting to 72.4% in the urban areas. Urban areas had a higher unemployment rate at 11.5% than rural areas with 4.2%. The unemployment rate for males, in both rural and urban areas, was higher than that of females.

Table 7: Percentage distribution of employed persons (15 years or older) by sector and sex, Zambia (2014)			
Sector	Total employed persons	Male	Female
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	48.9	40.8	56.2
Mining and quarrying	1.4	2.7	0.2
Manufacturing	3.8	5.6	2.2
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning	0.3	0.5	0.1
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities	0.2	0.3	0.1
Construction	3.1	6.4	0.2
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	11.8	11.2	12.3
Transport and storage	2.6	5.2	0.2
Accommodation and food service activities	1.2	1.2	1.2
Information and communication	0.3	0.4	0.3
Financial and insurance activities	0.3	0.3	0.3
Real estate activities	0.1	0.1	0.1
Professional, scientific and technical activities	0.2	0.4	0.1
Administrative and support service activities	0.9	1.6	0.2
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security	1.2	2.2	0.3
Education	2.7	2.9	2.5
Human health and social work activities	1.1	1.1	1.1
Art, entertainment, and recreation	0.2	0.2	0.1
Other service activities	1.8	1.6	2.1
Activities of households as employer	17.4	14.8	19.8
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies	0.1	0.1	0.0
Not classified elsewhere	0.3	0.3	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Source: adapted from CSO (2014)			

Youth unemployment is higher in the urban context. In rural as well as in urban areas male youth unemployment was higher than among women. This can be explained by multiple employment possibilities in households for women, which are generally badly paid and normally only part-time.

2.4 Impacts of urbanisation on agricultural land use

Generally, housing is the land consumer number one in the urban areas. Informal housing is created without formal authorisation and mostly initiated by the dwellers themselves. Most often these settlements are erected on unbuilt urban peripheral land, with or without legal title. The structure is dominated by single family dwelling that sometimes incorporate tenants, with a high percentage of owner-occupiers. Poor infrastructure and urban services are a result of the illegal status of these settlements. Poor quality housing imposes a great health burden on the population residing there. On the city and city-region level, pollution of surface waters, ground water and soil through inadequate water and waste management is prevalent, as is air pollution through increased traffic and industrial activities. Another problem faced by an unregulated increase of settlements is the disappearance of unsealed ground in inner cities as well as in the periphery. Moreover, a loss of agricultural land near to towns and cities leads to increased transport needs.

Likewise, the land consumption of the development of New Cities at the edge of the big cities is widely criticized as detrimental to peri-urban agriculture. However, Satterthwaite, McGranahan and Tacoli (2010: 2816) argue: "(...) the loss of agricultural land to the spatial expansion of urban areas is often exaggerated; one recent study suggested that only West Europe among the world's regions has more than 1 per cent of its land area as urban (Schneider et al., 2009). In addition, a declining proportion of land used for agriculture around a city may be accompanied by more intensive production for land that remains in agriculture (see Bentinck, 2000) or intensive urban agriculture on land not classified as agricultural." However, it should be noted that the development of informal settlements has increased again in the past five years.

Rapid urbanization goes hand in hand with rising demand for basic foodstuffs, and with the emergence of a middle class also for "luxury" and imported food. Generally, urban dwellers tend to consume more processed and pre-prepared foods. How this influences land use around the urban areas depends on a whole set of framework conditions. Urbanisation is accompanied by a change of the whole food chain, one of them is the emergence of supermarkets. Those generally prefer large agricultural producers, which are yet rarely found near cities. Amenities like electricity and with it the increasing use of refrigerators changes the demand frequency. But: "growing demand from high-income urban dwellers or from tourists may also support the growth of a range of high-value food crops that provide more scope for many local farms (and smaller farmers) and may have valuable multiplier links within the local economy." (Satterthwaite et al., 2010: 2815).


Tanson, Djohy and Edja (2013) concluded from a smaller empirical study that the rapid urbanisation process in Banikoara (main cotton growing area in Benin) increased the vulnerability of the adjacent farmers. As the expansion of urban planned zones into fertile lands led to a splitting of farm land into smaller fields and thus to a displacement of cropland into unsafe and less fertile regions. The African Economic Outlook presents a balanced review of West-African urbanisation

as being “the most spectacular manifestation of West African settlement dynamics witnessed in the past decades. (...) Settlement dynamics in West African towns and intermediary cities show that urban and rural populations are moving even closer together (...). Rural areas that are well connected to urban markets have more diversified local economies, with a higher share of off-farm employment and income from non-agricultural activities” (AfDB, 2016: 159–160).

Leulseged et al. (2012) assert that Addis Ababa has expanded its built-up areas by 12,093 km² within 24 years, encroaching on croplands, forestlands, and grasslands. The effect of this urban sprawl has been forest and soil degradation, water pollution, agricultural community displacement, and the emergence of further informal housing.

Table 8: Land use and land cover changes of Addis Ababa city, 1986–2010						
LULC type	1986		2000		2010	
	km²	%	km²	%	km²	%
Built-up areas	67.08	12.95	124.61	24.06	188.01	36.28
Forest cover	192.54	37.16	80.82	15.60	67.86	13.10
Grassland	25.21	4.87	28.55	5.51	23.69	4.57
Cropland	233.25	45.02	284.02	54.83	238.63	46.05
Total	518	100	518	100	518	100
Source: adapted from Kasa et al. (2012: 15)						

A Landsat analysis by Kasa et al. (2012: 15) clearly confirms that built-up areas have spread at the cost of the forest. The first wave of urban expansion between 1986 and 2000 was accompanied by an increased demand for wood for building purposes, which also contributed to the loss of forest. As already mentioned, in Ethiopia, the state owns the land and designates its purpose. However, still today quite a portion of agricultural land is illegally sold by farmers to urban dwellers to build houses. Regarding the impact of the horizontal growth of Addis Ababa, Kasa et al. (2012: 16) emphasize, that: “inappropriate solid and liquid waste disposal is polluting urban and peri-urban water, soil, and the air. Based on the discussions made with peri-urban communities in the study area, due to such poor waste disposals, some peri-urban water sources become out of use. Human and livestock health problems were also reported. (...) As a result, some households reported they either destock or cease livestock production.” The authors also found that the greater the distance to public transport stations, the more likely it is that relocated households will stay in agriculture. In summary, the urban sprawl of Addis Ababa is endangering the provisioning, regulating, and supporting services of the ecosystem. Besides impacts on the ecosystem, the sprawl of Addis Ababa has already caused severe conflicts between farmers and urban dwellers. Moreover, the new “Master Plan” of the Ethiopian Government to expand Addis Ababa into the State of Oromia has caused a political crisis and violent disputes. The expansion plans are seen as government land grab, which threatens local farmers and will lead to mass evictions.



In a study on urban agriculture and economic change in the Zambia Copperbelt with special reference to Ndola, Kitwe and Luanshya, Smart (2014) argues that urban agriculture has been a forceful strategy to soften the serious consequences of the deterioration of the mining sector in the Copperbelt. It can be understood as a response to economic restructuring and decline.

Table 9: Incidences of urban and peri-urban agriculture in Luanshya, Kitwe and Ndola (%)				
	Luanshya	Kitwe	Ndola	Total
Low-density	94	94	81	90
High-density	91	72	76	79
Total	93	83	78	84

Source: adapted from Smart (2014: 150)

Quite a number of respondents in the study of Smart not only grew food and kept livestock but also grew medicinal plants for family use and for sale. Thirty-five percent of all respondents marketed some of the produce from their farm or garden, while more urban farmers in the high-density areas sold their products than in low-density areas. Urban agriculture in the Copperbelt towns is an informal livelihood strategy which also creates jobs. However, in general only informal and seasonal labour is employed in this sector. Pollution from the copper smelters, which release sulphur dioxide into the air, leading to acidification of the soils, has been identified as one of the threats to urban agriculture, besides a general shortage of valuable land in and around the cities.




Figure 9: Increase of built up area 2002–2014, Ndola

Source: NYU Urban Expansion Program; UN-Habitat; Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (2016)

2.5 Summary

Different Cities

- Only a few cities have been founded since independence. Most African Governments have followed a policy of centralisation.
- New city projects (planned urban areas on the periphery of an existing city, with provisions for residential, commercial, industrial and retail facilities) are a very recent trend. It is not yet clear whether they are successful in creating jobs, but for a limited time they generate employment in the construction industry, also for low-skilled workers.
- Urbanisation processes as well as the political, socio-economic and planning environment in today's cities of sub-Saharan Africa are extremely heterogeneous, and volatile. This makes generalisations difficult and a one size fits all solution is almost impossible.
- A classification of countries in terms of their urbanisation rate, fertility rate and change from agricultural based income can give a first insight into urban processes, but the specific features of each case have to be considered in further detail.
- Precarious housing not only jeopardizes the health of the inhabitants and creates environmental problems but also has a big impact on the national economy.

Urban economies in Benin, Ethiopia and Zambia

- Jobs are created mostly in the informal sector.
- Urban youth unemployment and underemployment is particularly high.
- The labour force in the agriculture and food sector of Benin consists of more than 70% without formal school education.
- The Beninese service sector is the most formalized with half of the employed workforce in the formal sector.
- In Benin, pluri-activity increases with age and with a lower level of education.
- In Ethiopia, the building sector for housing and transport infrastructure has led to a fast-growing construction industry, which accounts for a significant number of short term jobs.
- Large cities in Ethiopia are characterized by lower employment rates than smaller towns, where employment is more oriented towards primary activities, as well as to the hotel and restaurant sector.
- The textile and leather sector in Ethiopia is in the process of creating more jobs.
- Nearly half of the Zambian workforce are active in agriculture, forestry, and fishing; in the urban areas this sector accounts for a third of jobs.

Urbanisation and land use

- Housing (formal and informal) is the land consumer number one in the urban areas.
- Land consumption for the development of New Cities at the edge of the big cities is widely criticized as detrimental to peri-urban agriculture.
- Urbanisation is accompanied by a change in the food chain. Supermarkets generally prefer large agricultural producers, which are at present rarely found in the vicinity of cities.
- In Addis Ababa, urban sprawl encroached on cropland, forests, and grasslands with the effect of soil degradation, water pollution, agricultural community displacement and the emergence of further informal housing.

3 Driving factors and patterns of rural-urban migration in sub-Saharan Africa

3.1 Theories of migration and their applicability to rural-urban migration in sub-Saharan Africa

Theories of migration, postulate an anticipated improvement in “well-being” as a precondition for migration. To varying degrees, most theories take anticipated wage differentials or at least income considerations as a prerequisite for decisions to migrate.

On the micro-level, individual motives are at the centre of consideration. Push-pull models (first proposed by Lee, 1966) look at the positive and negative factors in the place of origin and the destination. The sum of all positive and negative factors will result in migration or non-migration. These approaches have been criticized as merely summing up different factors, without considering the causal mechanisms involved. Others criticise the underlying assumption that potential migrants are fully informed about all opportunities and constraints. Additionally, this approach does not explain why, under the same conditions, some people move and others do not. Many empirical studies on migration show that even where a calculation of push and pull factors comes to a negative result people may still migrate, and vice versa. This means that predictions of migration processes based only on a calculation of push and pull factors are bound to fail. Too many factors, lying in the very individuality of every single person and too many short time changes cannot be accounted for in empirical studies – not to mention the methodological problems of capturing, understanding, and even predicting human behaviour.

Neoclassical micro-migration theories like human capital approaches focus on migration as an individual, rational investment decision to increase income in the future. Here the assumption is that individuals make rational decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis of expected gains and will only migrate if the gains expected in the future outweigh migration costs (Sjaastadt, 1962; Fischer et. al., 1997). Focussed on the labour market, this approach can give some explanation on the selectivity of migrants (e.g. age, education as factors) but again presume a fully rational and informed decision-making and neglect structural and individual factors supporting or obstructing a decision.

Other behavioural decision making models (Jong/Fawcett, 1981; Ritchey, 1976) stress a cognitive decision of the migrant which is based on more than income aspects. Values like prosperity, independence, justice, security and expectations form the basis for decision-making, they are based on personal and household characteristics (e.g. education, age, sex, religion) and societal norms. Although considering non-economic factors, once again it is postulated that the migrant is fully informed and in a position to make rational choices.

Combining micro- and macro-perspectives, Hoffmann-Novotny (1981) further develops Heintz's work on structural tensions and applies it to migration. Starting from the assumption that central social values are material and immaterial, (e.g. relating to income, education or power), the so-

cial standing of a person or group arises from the entitlement to participate in these central social values. However, these goods are unequally distributed in a society and the opportunity of participation is dependent on individual or group assets and the institutional setting of social systems. As power and prestige are unequally distributed in a society, tensions develop within the different system units. According to Hoffmann-Novotny, migration is a means to resolve power and prestige tensions. Very often the upward movement in status that is desired by migrants is only transformed into other tensions, for example when migrants arrive in the city and start there at the lowest rank in urban society. According to this approach, migrants arriving with a low rank are not likely to achieve a high rank in the society of the receiving country. Under-casting arises, with means that migrants take on the lowest rank, while low rank locals experience an upward mobility in comparison to the newcomers. Hoffmann-Novotny applied his theory to explain international migration.

But, extended and applied to internal migration it could also explain some causes and results of rural-urban migration and its perpetuation. In the hope of an upward mobility in social standing people migrate to the cities where they initially form the lowest rank in urban society, expressed for example by their precarious living conditions in slums. However, in their home destination they are still seen to be on the upward ladder and by withholding some details of their living conditions they experience an improvement of their social standing in the reference societies of the sending areas. Some incidents of the perpetuation of migration systems under adverse conditions could thus be explained (Massey, 1990; Lohnert, 2007b).

Macro-theories of migration generally explain migration as a result of differences between labour supply and labour demand on a spatial level. According to these approaches, once the wage differential is equalized, migration comes to a halt. The high unemployment rates among rural-urban migrants are accounted for by the inclusion of the perception of prospective migrants (Harris-Todaro model, 1970). As long as migrants expect better job opportunities, migration persists.

The dual market theory (Piore, 1979) explains the acceptance of low paid, insecure and low status jobs by migrants in the receiving areas by the fact that migrants do not consider themselves as members of the destination society.

Cumulative and circular causation approaches (Massey, 1990) try to explain how migration sustains itself. Each migration process changes the socio-economic context of migrant households, which again will change decision making. As networks are broadened and intensified, sending communities become more adjusted to migration and migration might be accessible for more and more people. According to this approach, migration accelerates until networks are saturated, labour becomes scarce and migration potential decreases leaving old, very young and handicapped in the sending area.

The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) integrates the household as an agent in decision making, considering remittances as a link between decision and outcome of migration (among others: Stark & Bloom, 1985). In the household models, the labour capacity of family members is allocated between migration and non-migration work to maximize the household's expected benefits. Applied to rural-urban migration, households decide to send one or more members to a job market that is not related to the local labour market, thus diversifying the in-

come portfolio. In a system of mutual interdependence, where all household members have the impression of gaining from this arrangement, risk crises and shocks can be cushioned. As soon as one party feels outsmarted and wants to pull out, the whole contract is at stake and cooperation is likely to be enforced (Lohnert, 2007a).

The perpetuation of migration is explained by aspects like: social capital, social networks, migration institutions and cumulative and circular migration (Hagen-Zanker, 2008: 16). The role of social links for migration has been widely discussed. After a pioneer period, new channels of communication are established. Migrant communities serve as anchor and help in the destinations, reducing migration costs and risks. Although migrant networks have the tendency to perpetuate themselves via institutionalisation and path dependency, etc., they are nevertheless dependent on external factors, e. g. labour market changes, changes in migration laws or security issues. But having access to a migration network is a major social asset in the migration process.

To conclude: migration and migration patterns are dynamic and change over time, and so do the driving forces. Individual and group values and norms are subject to alterations. Frame conditions change. Security situations, world or regional economic crises or booms, extreme short term events and long term climate change processes all have impacts on local, regional and international migration processes. All theories agree that the migration decision involves weighing up costs and benefits. Most theories consider income considerations on different levels as one of the key conditions for migrations.

3.2 Migration patterns to and around the cities of sub-Saharan Africa

In addition to rural-urban migration, there are also urban-urban, rural-rural, urban-rural and inter-African migration processes into the cities of South Africa and (for West-Africa) into the harbour towns of Nigeria. For example, Nigeria experienced an immigration of 2.5 million skilled and unskilled labourers from western African countries during the oil boom between 1970 and 1980. Of these were 81% from Ghana, 12% from Niger, and 3% from Togo and Benin (Atlas of West Africa). International migration of highly skilled persons is mainly directed to the US and Europe. To cushion the negative effects of the brain-drain (e.g. doctors from Ghana to Great Britain), efforts have been made to grant multiple entry visas to enhance circular migration.

While in the past it was above all young men who found their way into the city, today the portion of women has considerably increased, in some cases now even exceeding male migration.

Migration is induced by various factors in the social, economic, political, cultural and eco-systems spheres. Reviewing the literature, work seems to be most important reason for rural-urban migration. Often it is not wage-differentials that influence the decision but the mere opportunity to find an income at all. A lot of rural areas do not provide enough job opportunities. Agriculture for many people is not a lucrative option in view of a growing rural population, poor infrastructure provision and changing climatic conditions. Besides, there are quite a number of urban pull factors like a rural-urban utility-gap, which is consolidated by urban-biased policies. In times of political unrest and war, cities might provide shelter and the access to emergency aid.

There are various kinds of migration, from temporary to circular and permanent migration, from individual transfer of residence to the migration of whole extended families.

Circular migration typically is a repeated movement between origin and destination with substantial time spent in both places (in contrast to commuting). It is the dominant type of voluntary movements in sub-Saharan Africa and is “increasingly recognized as one of the few means for resources to flow from core areas ... to peripheral areas” (Hugo, 2013: 2). Very often, this migration is linked to the agricultural seasons. Rural-urban migrants return to their rural home at times of labour peaks to help small-scale farmers. Of course, labour demands differ according to the crops and the climatic conditions of the respective region. But, with an improved transport infrastructure, together with job opportunities further away, the distances of migration can increase and migrants thus would be less likely to return home for the farming season. Also demand for labour in cities might vary, e.g. building and construction works are usually reduced during rainy seasons.

Another type of **seasonal migration** occurs between rural areas of different climatic and agro-ecological zones. If labour demand on the farm is low, migrants move to large farms in times of high labour demand. This type of rural-rural migration is characteristic for Zambia (e.g. sugar harvest) and Benin (cotton harvest).

In Ethiopia, **politically induced migration** has been a key feature. Military confrontations (Derg regime 1974–1987) resulted in massive internal displacements, mainly into the cities of Ethiopia and especially to Addis Ababa. At the same time, the regime started a resettlement programme from Northern and Central Ethiopia to the Western parts of the country. Due to discontent of the displaced people, this resulted in “(...) flows towards cities to avoid living in settlements established and controlled by government (...)” (Mberu, 2006: 511). Mberu (2006: 511–512) further argues that after the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came into power and prompted an ethnic federalist policy, many of the previously displaced people returned to their place of origin or went into the cities.


Also, **return migration** plays a significant role, as a large number of people return home to the rural areas after their withdrawal from working life. The vision of returning to the area of origin, whether realized or not, has significant impacts on the behaviour of migrants in the urban as well as the rural areas. The keeping of strong ties to the “home area” influences investment decisions and the sense of ownership.

3.2.1 Diversification, multilocality and the rural-urban interface

Although some cities of sub-Saharan Africa still grow through rural-urban migration, it is in many cases not a steady group that become urban residents. Rather a substantial number of migrants are living in bi-local or multi-local households to enhance the chances of their kin to cope with their living conditions, not only through monetary income generation but also by a spatial diversification of income production. The actions in one household branch can directly influence the behaviour of another associated household. Also, the composition of a household can change over time (e.g. if seasonal work is available). Migration concerns not only the migrating individual, but a whole number of other people in the urban and rural areas. And the interweaving goes in

both directions. For example, the incomes which are achieved by household members in the town can support rural members, who may in turn care for the children of the urban dwellers. Relationships with the area of origin also offer a sort of assurance which allows the return in periods of crises and thus cushions the risks of migration.

So, rural out-migration can serve as a coping strategy in times of increasing vulnerability, for example after a bad harvest or as an adaptation strategy e.g. against long-term environmental change processes. But of course, there are a number of other push and pull factors that have to be considered.



For many migrant families, the urban lifestyle is not the centre of their life. The emotional and cultural connections to the rural areas of origin are still very high, as can be seen in many different customs and habits, such as the importance of funerals in the home village and certain celebrations and festivals. For many, the city is a stopover, until the return to the areas of origin—, even though this is not always achievable. This applies not only to poorer groups but also high officials and university employees. On the other hand, more and more younger people intend to stay in the city.

Within the cities, new livelihood interrelations are created by the migrants, which very often resemble ethnic islands fed by chain migration processes. Hybrid forms develop between rural, "ethnic-traditional" life and, modern, western style of urban life. The rural-urban contexture creates a liminal space of being in-between. The spatial regrouping of people from one area can be explained by the fact that migration is already prepared in the areas of origin, as one turns to migrated family members or acquaintances for information and help. The urban migrant communities can serve as a safety-net in a strange surrounding. Nevertheless, migrant communities can also serve as an observation and control institution to report on members to the rural house-

hold members, for example about income and earnings. It is perceived as a moral obligation to send remittances and migrants are expected to return for special occasions like celebrations and funerals. Any failure can lead to more or less severe consequences (from reminders and warnings to witchcraft and expulsion of the community).

Multilocality and multiplicity of income generation is for many households in sub-Saharan Africa meanwhile the normality rather than the exception. The engagement of different household members in different sectors and in different locations has proven to be a working mechanism to cushion the effects of population growth and economic change. According to Satterthwaite et al. (2010: 2813) non-agricultural activities and remittances are important contributions to the reduction of rural poverty in many places, and "earnings from non-farm activities are estimated to account for 30–50% of rural household income in Africa (...)." The financing of innovation and intensification of agriculture is very much dependent on earnings from non-farm activities, as access to credit schemes are rare in the rural areas. However, while urban unemployment and living costs in the urban area rise and the informal sector is increasingly saturated, the amounts of money sent are declining.

The life between the "rural" and the "urban" and the ever-shifting hybridity of relations has blurred the divide between cities and countryside. So-called "typical" place-based occupations have been de-placed. Some sort of agricultural activity is performed by around 50% of urban dwellers in sub-Saharan Africa, including the growing of crops for nostalgic reasons rather than for food. The African Economic Outlook (AEA, 2016: 160) states that "(...) data for the period 2009-14 (show that), 85% of dwellers aged 15 or older in the towns of non-diversifier African countries are involved in agriculture, while the share is 49% in big cities and suburbs. In Africa's diversifier countries, the ratio stands at 32% in towns and 16% in big cities and suburbs." Besides the hybridisation of life, improvements in transport infrastructure and the emergence, and growing importance of small and medium cities can facilitate shorter and more temporary migration. Migrant practices more often than not reflect density patterns and the quality of transport infrastructure. Generally, urbanisation trends in Africa have not been linear processes but varied over time, in direction and velocity. As already mentioned, Zambia for example has experienced times of de-urbanisation especially in the Copperbelt towns due to changing economic opportunities since the 1980. Other counties underwent periods of time when urban growth processes stagnated or increased only slowly. The African Economic Outlook (AfDB, 2016: 161) states that "(...) although de-urbanisation occurred in other parts of the world (for instance in China during the Maoist era, in Cambodia during Pol Pot's rule and in Thailand in the aftermath of the 1998 financial crisis), de-urbanisation episodes have been more frequent in sub-Saharan Africa over the past 30 years (Bairoch, 1988; Clark, 2009)."

3.2.2 Here to stay?

Whether migrants will stay once they have migrated to the city or under which conditions they will return to the rural areas of origin has been a subject of debate. Besides general economic aspirations, several other factors are important in the decision making of staying or returning. While older people who have an entitlement to a pension, unskilled workers, or people who have entitlement to land in the rural areas are more likely to return, younger and well educated people are more likely to stay.

Marriage and divorce are nowadays strong factors for women to go to the cities. In many African countries, education possibilities for girls have been steadily improved while at the same time the awareness of gender mainstreaming at local level is growing. Simultaneously, more information is available for women through media reports and migrated family members. Generally, the younger, better educated women no longer want to spend their life with agricultural work and try to find a job and a husband in the city (e.g. on Ouagadougou, Nielsen & D'haen, 2015: 10).

Divorce is another reason for women to leave the rural areas, especially in patrilineal and patrilocal kinship systems, where the women move in with their husband and his family. Once divorced, women have no place to go and turn to the cities. But quite a number of women consider migration as an opportunity to get out of an unwanted marriage.

For a wider rural population, the increased option to migrate into cities and towns is also a means to escape witchcraft and sorcery. Some explain the power of witchcraft as a reaction to globalisation and modernity (e.g. Comaroff & Comaroff, 1993; Geschiere, 2011). Older women and children are the most vulnerable targets of accusations of sorcery. People accused of being a sorcerer and people who perceive themselves as a target of sorcery are migrating into the anonymity of great cities.

A number of people who could not meet the expectations of rural family members in terms of increased income and upward mobility may stay in the urban area out of embarrassment and in the hope of being more successful in the future. This perceived "failure" adds to a discourse on urban life in the rural areas which is dominated by positive aspects. Especially the less successful migrants withhold information about their negative living conditions which would otherwise discourage other potential migrants.

Younger people are often sent to a relative in the city to get secondary or tertiary education. Older and ill people might migrate to the cities in the search of better medical treatment. Also, the expectance of better social services can add to the decision to migrate. During times of hunger and unrest, people migrate to the cities in search of security and food aid, as most aid organisations do not reach the remote rural areas.

The following groups of rural-urban migrants are likely to stay in the city:

- young and well educated persons,
- landless people,
- people who are included in social welfare schemes,
- women who fled the rural areas as a result of divorce or other family problems,
- people affected either by sorcery accusations or as victims of sorcery,
- less successful migrants who still hope to live up to the expectations of their kin,
- rural environmental migrants without alternatives to other agricultural land.

3.2.3 Environmental change: the importance as driver in rural-urban migration

Environmental change processes can influence migration decisions in three ways:

1. Warming and drying in some regions are expected to reduce agricultural productivity and lead to water scarcity and soil deterioration,
2. Extreme weather events like heavy rainfall and/or storms in tropical regions will induce floods and destroy agricultural land and settlements,
3. Sea level rise will lead to relocation of coastal settlements. Many large cities are built in coastal areas, so this might lead to urban-urban migration processes.

As with other push factors it is difficult to determine the exact extent that the environment plays in the decision to migrate. As already mentioned, it is normally a bundle of factors that trigger a decision, and usually more than one person is involved in the decision making. Also, environmental processes that lead to migration often build up over longer periods and are accompanied by socio-cultural, political and economic factors.

For Africa, Barrios et al. (2006: 20) examined decreasing rainfall as a possible explanation for urban population increase. They come to the conclusion that: "Specifically, we find that while shortages in rainfall have acted to increase rates of urbanization on the sub-Saharan African continent, there is no evidence of such for the rest of the developing world. Moreover, our analysis suggests that this link was reinforced after colonial independence of sub-Saharan African countries, which often resulted in the simultaneous lifting of legislation prohibiting the free internal movement of native Africans."

An increase in the variability of precipitation have been observed over recent decades, especially in the Sahelian countries, which in combination with a growing population and thus growing competition for agricultural land will lead to a further southward migration. On the example of rural-urban migration in Burkina Faso, Nielsen and D'haen (2015) found that a significant number of formerly circular migrants no longer return to the rural areas. Barrios et al. (2006: 18) estimate that rainfall reduction of 1% has increased the sub-Saharan African urbanisation rate by 0.45% – but this has not been verified empirically. The African Economic Outlook (2016: 169) expects 60 million people in the Sahel and in the Horn of Africa to migrate between 2016 and 2020 as a result of the degradation of soils.

For Benin, Sow et al. (2014: 377) argue that migration is induced by: "increased living costs, difficult climatic conditions and dwindling natural resources, population growth, poverty and unemployment." Especially the northwest of Benin (Atacora) has consistently experienced food deficits since 1980s. To underpin the interdependence of natural and social factors, Sow et al. (2014: 387) demonstrate that: "In the context of northwest Benin, "marriage migration" (exchanges, theft of young girls and elopements) are common social practices. These practices have some socio-environmental implications, whereby the respective roles of the actors are defined in the migration process. The spatial dispersion of unions occurs mainly between villages or across borders and faraway areas in order to escape social control. The "spatiality" of these unions is sometimes modelled in response to risks. This is particularly evident in areas that are potentially affected by environmental change stressors."

By analysing data from the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey, which represents panel data from around 1,500 households in areas of the rural highlands of Ethiopia over fifteen years, Gray and Mueller (2012) found a positive and significant correlation between drought and migration for men, but a non-significant correlation for women.

However, predictions are extremely difficult and more than once they have proven false. A decade ago, UNEP forecast 50 million climate refugees by 2010 – which has been more than a slight miscalculation.

The report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014: 1239) argues that “besides low-lying islands and coastal and deltaic regions in general, sub-Saharan Africa is one of the regions that would particularly be affected by environmentally induced migration”. Referring to case studies from Somalia and Burundi, a strong argument is made for the interaction of environmental and political drivers for migration, such as climate change, disaster, conflict, and forced displacement (Kolmannskog, 2010). On the other hand, in stable countries with few conflicts, drivers for migration are more likely to be related to economic and environmental drivers (Tschakert and Tutu, 2010).

In sum: environmental change can hardly be isolated in an intersection of multiple drivers for the decision to migrate and the empirical basis to relate migration directly to a changing environment is still weak.

Quotes from the IPCC report on Africa (IPCC, 2014: 2002–2003):

- “It is likely that land temperatures over Africa will rise faster than the global land average, particularly in the more arid regions, and that the rate of increase in minimum temperatures will exceed that of maximum temperatures.”
- “Projected rainfall change over sub-Saharan Africa in the mid- and late 21st century is uncertain. In regions of high or complex topography such as the Ethiopian Highlands, downscaled projections indicate likely increases in rainfall and extreme rainfall by the end of the 21st century.”
- “Water resources are subjected to high hydro-climatic variability over space and time, and are a key constraint on the continent’s continued economic development. The impacts of climate change will be superimposed onto already water-stressed catchments with complex land uses, engineered water systems, and a strong historical socio-political and economic footprint.”
- “(...) changes in precipitation are very likely to reduce cereal crop productivity. This will have strong adverse effects on food security. New evidence is also emerging that high-value perennial crops could also be adversely affected by temperature rise (medium confidence). Pest, weed, and disease pressure on crops and livestock is expected to increase as a result of climate change combined with other factors (low confidence).”

- “Livelihood-based approaches for managing risks to food production from multiple stressors, including rainfall variability, have increased substantially in Africa since the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) /2007 rem. of the author/. While these efforts can improve the resiliency of agricultural systems in Africa over the near term, current adaptations will be insufficient for managing risks from long-term climate change, which will be variable across regions and farming system types.”
- “A wide array of conservation agriculture practices, including agroforestry and farmer-managed natural tree regeneration, conservation tillage, contouring and terracing, and mulching, are being increasingly adopted in Africa. These practices strengthen resilience of the land base to extreme events and broaden sources of livelihoods, both of which have strongly positive implications for climate risk management and adaptation.”

“(...) the degradation of natural resources as a result of both overexploitation and climate change will contribute to increased conflicts over the distribution of these resources. Many of the interacting social, demographic, and economic drivers of observed urbanization and migration in Africa are sensitive to climate change impacts.”

3.3 Summary

- All theories on migration postulate as a necessary precondition for migration an anticipated rise in “well-being”. Most theories take the neoclassical paradigm of anticipated wage differentials or at least income considerations as prerequisite for individuals or groups making decisions to migrate. However, the theoretical approaches differ in terms of trying to explain either causes or the persistence of migration regimes – some do both.
- Many empirical studies on migration show very clearly that even if a calculation of push and pull factors comes to a negative result, people still migrate (and vice versa). This means that predictions of migration processes based only on a calculation of push and pull factors are bound to fail.
- Migration and migration patterns change over time. So do the drivers. Individual and group values and norms are subject to alterations. Frame conditions change. Security situations, world or regional economic crises or booms, extreme short term events and long term climate change processes such as changes in population size all have impacts on local, regional and international migration processes.
- Reviewing the literature on rural-urban migration, work seems to be most important reason. Often it is not wage-differentials that influence the decision but the opportunity to find any income at all.
- From temporary to circular and permanent migration, from individual migration to the transfer of whole extended families, a bundle of different kinds and manners of migration are found in sub-Saharan Africa. And all kinds of hybrid and transitional forms are observed.

- Circular migration is the dominant type of voluntary movement in sub-Saharan Africa and is increasingly recognized as one of few possibilities for resource flows from core to peripheral areas.
- Although some cities of sub-Saharan Africa still grow through rural-urban migration, it is in many cases not a steady group that become urban residents. Rather a substantial number of migrants are living in bi-local or multi-local households to enhance the chances of their kin to cope with their living conditions, not only through monetary income generation but also by a spatial diversification of income-production.
- Within the cities, new livelihood interrelations are created by the migrants which very often resemble ethnic islands fed by chain migration processes. Hybrid forms develop between rural, “ethnic-traditional” life and, modern, western style of urban life. The rural-urban contexture creates a liminal space of being in-between.
- Multilocality and multiplicity of income generation is for many households in sub-Saharan Africa the normality rather than the exception. The engagement of different household members in different sectors and in different locations has proved to be a working mechanism to cushion the effects of population growth and economic change.
- The life between the “rural” and the “urban” and the ever-shifting hybridity of relations has blurred the divide between cities and countryside. Some sort of agricultural activity is performed by around 50% of urban dwellers in sub-Saharan Africa.
- Improvements in transport infrastructure and the growing importance of small and medium cities can facilitate shorter and more temporary migration. Migrant practices frequently reflect density patterns and the quality of transport infrastructure.
- Besides general economic drivers, the following groups of rural-urban migrants are more likely to stay in the city:
 - young and well educated persons,
 - landless people,
 - people who are included in social welfare schemes,
 - women who fled the rural areas as a result of divorce or other family problems,
 - people affected either by sorcery accusations or as victims of sorcery,
 - less successful migrants who still hope to live up to the expectations of their kin,
 - rural environmental migrants without alternatives to other, agricultural land.
- It is difficult to determine the exact extent that the environment plays in the decision to migrate. It is normally a whole bundle of factors that trigger a decision, typically there is more than one person involved in the decision making and, in the case of environmental change, the environmental processes that lead to migration often build up over longer periods of time and are accompanied by socio-cultural, political and economic factors.

4 Work opportunities for a mobile population in sub-Saharan Africa

4.1 Urban labour markets

Rapid urbanization has not been accompanied by a corresponding creation of formal employment. Despite average GDP growth rates of around 5% over the past 15 years, the proportion of the labour force in vulnerable employment dropped by only 2% between 2000 and 2015. Especially the service sector increased, and here self-employment or own-account work. The largest service branch in African cities is the trade, hotel and restaurant service sector which absorbs predominantly low-skilled workers and is mainly sustained by informal, micro and small enterprises such as hawkers and convenience shops (AEO, 2016: 152). But, as the employment share of trade, hotel and restaurant services has been rising, the average earnings have dropped.

The “traditional” pattern of employment transformation has been described as a shift from informal subsistence agriculture to organized and formalized work in manufacturing and services. In African cities of today, the manufacturing and service sectors are placed in the informal part of the economy with only a small proportion of employment being created in the formal/organized sector. Many hybrid forms of production and services are observed. For example, informal and clandestine shoemakers in the Mercato in Addis Ababa sell their produce on to formal traders. The shoe clusters of Addis Ababa are a good example of ethnic enterprises and the establishment of rural-urban migration chains. Gurage people, living South-West of Addis Ababa in the Southern Nations Nationalities and People’s Region dominate the shoe production and will only transfer knowledge and skills within their kin and clan (Tebarek Lika, 2011).

4.1.1 Self-employment, small and medium-sized enterprises

The private sector in Africa is divided into two main parts: small and medium enterprises which often operate in the informal sector, and comparatively few very large firms that are often foreign owned with access to international markets. Middle sized firms are very rare, indicating constraints in the transition from small informal to middle sized formal enterprises. Insufficient accounting and management skills of the entrepreneurs, administrative hurdles, as well as lacking credit facilities are among the reasons why middle sized firms could not break into the market.

There are a number of examples where clusters have been set up and flourished. As already mentioned, the footwear cluster in Mercato, Addis Ababa is a very dynamic natural cluster in Ethiopia. After a time of heavy competition through Chinese imported shoes in the 1990s, the branch has substantially increased from 500 to some 1,600 producers.

Another cluster development based on traditional knowledge is the Shiro Meda handloom cluster in Addis Ababa, at the foot of the Entoto Hills. Weaving is traditionally a homebased industry both in the rural and urban areas. The Shiro Meda weavers migrated from the southern part of Ethiopia to Addis Ababa some 60 years ago, taking their knowledge to town. Traditionally woven

products are produced mainly for the local market, some for tourists, and a small proportion for international markets and there especially for the Ethiopian diaspora. Contrary to the shoe cluster, the handloom cluster has not grown over the years.

As formal employment is becoming increasingly hard to find, and is not seen as being very lucrative, young people are increasingly setting up their own business to achieve economic security. The vast majority of these businesses are in the informal trading branch, followed by providing services, while only a small proportion are engaged in manufacturing. Some businesses, like grocery stores, bottle stores, brewing, bars, trading of second-hand clothes, advertising, and hairdressers are normally run by men and women. Other businesses are divided into more male or female occupations like men engaging in carpentry, welding, car-washing and shoe mending, while selling fresh vegetables and fruits or prepared food are female dominated activities.

Many occupations are performed only casually, like “parking boys”, “car watchers” or “car washers” in the cities, or as on-call casual labourer mainly in construction. Women mainly work casually as domestic servants, child minders, bar maids, waitresses and so on. Casual employment is insecure and irregular.

4.1.2 Formal employment in the private sector, examples of Zambia

In the following, a concise overview is given of job opportunities in the formal sector in Zambia, drawing on the “Enterprise Map of Zambia” by Sutton & Langmead (2013) Zambia is taken as an example as many of the formal sector branches can also be found in other sub-Saharan countries as well.

Floriculture and horticulture

Floriculture and horticulture are growing export industries. Cut roses and summer flowers are grown for export. Horticultural products are also grown for export but supply increasingly also a growing urban middle class. Both industries are work intensive and can employ large numbers of people in growing and packing, particularly women. As the major part of the produce is grown in greenhouses and under plastic, this branch offers employment all year round. However, the location near to international transport infrastructure is a precondition for success, so nearly all flower producers are found in the vicinity of Lusaka International Airport. The global market share of Zambia in small-headed sweetheart roses lies at around 50%: the only other producers are Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Ethiopia.

Beverages

Zambia produces alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages mainly for the national market. Large-scale industrial multinationals, dominated by Zambian Breweries, National Breweries and Varun Beverages produce carbonated soft drinks (e.g. Coca-Cola, Fanta, Seven-Up, etc.) from concentrate. These are bottled by the local licence holders for distribution countrywide. Locally produced fruit juices are mainly made from imported concentrate. This sector could offer great opportunities for some rural areas, as Zambian fruit production is still in its infancy. Zambian Breweries is the only Zambia-based manufacturer of lager beer, while opaque beer (traditional beer made from sorghum and/or maize) is brewed by many medium and small enterprises in the market.

Textiles, garments and leather

Zambia's textile industry has declined due to cheap Chinese and second hand imports (see Table 10). The leather industry, however, is still operating, although at a low capacity.

Table 10: Textile and garment export earnings by sector in Zambia, 2005–2010 (all figures in thousands of USD)						
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Textiles	26,937	19,584	15,222	18,518	4,779	1,951
Garments	445	315	7,177	8,083	944	506
Total	29,387	21,905	24,406	28,609	7,732	4,467
Source: adapted from Sutton & Langmead (2013) after Export Audit Report 2010, Zambia Development Agency						

Construction

The construction industry is one of the fastest-growing sectors all over sub-Saharan Africa, except for countries affected by war and political unrest due to continued strong demand for residential, commercial and public infrastructure projects. The construction industry is one of the largest employers – in Zambia it is estimated that in 2013 between 13,000 and 15,000 people worked in the sector. However, the construction sector is especially vulnerable to political and economic influences.

Cement

Along with the growth in the construction sector, demand for cement has increased. In Zambia, the output of various cement plants increased from 817,000 MT in 2009 to 1,127,000 MT in 2010, and production is still increasing, providing a large number of semi-skilled jobs.

4.2 Opportunities for rural-urban migrants in sub-Saharan Africa: Where and for whom?

The growing internal and external mobility in sub-Saharan Africa (and with it urbanisation) will only lead to gains in combination with paid jobs and livelihood opportunities for incoming residents as well as a just distribution of infrastructure and basic services. Sub-Saharan Africa's investment priorities in material infrastructure, mainly transport, are in danger of perpetuating existing inequalities by cementing uneven access to livelihood chances. The burden of low skills will determine the job opportunities of rural-urban migrants. Especially the younger generation and women are bound to be locked into low-paying informal work. In recent years, the job creation in the cities has mainly been sustained by the increase of the service sector. Informal, micro and small enterprises in the hotel and restaurant service sector as well as trade, such as hawkers and convenience shops, have grown disproportionately.

Post-farm sector

Opportunities for low skilled migrants are to be found in expanding post-farm segments of food value chains (e.g. wholesaling, processing, logistics, warehousing, distribution, retailing, and food stalls): they can benefit from the economic effects of more concentrated urban areas. The nutrition transition as an outcome of economic and demographic changes in cities influences the composition of food towards more processed and more “non-traditional” eating habits. As the urban population grows, the demand for dairy products increases as well. This is a sector where countries with a high livestock population can find opportunities. Ethiopia, for example, currently manages the largest livestock population in Africa. In the proximity of Addis Ababa and regional towns, smallholders and commercial dairy farmers are part of the peri-urban milk system. Off-farm employment is provided by collection, processing and distribution. These change processes will also influence the production of vegetables, both for national and international markets.

Manufacturing sector

Generally, manufacturing subsectors that depend on local inputs are likely to have larger outputs and multiplier effects, especially when they are resource intensive, like food processing, textiles and leather production. Labour intensive jobs in the manufacturing sector which require skills that are not too different from current occupational skills could be a source of more productive employment for the pool of low-skilled labour in cities. So far, although there is a production of manufactured goods produced by a very large informal sector, these goods cater for the low end of domestic markets that have no direct competition from imports.

However, a World Bank study (Dinh, 2011: 113) states that: “Ethiopia has the potential to become globally competitive in large segments of light manufacturing (apparel, leather products, and agribusiness) and, if successful, could create millions of productive jobs in the process by leveraging its labour cost advantage (low wages combined with high labour productivity in good-practice firms) and comparative advantage in the natural resource industries (agriculture, livestock, and forestry).” The apparel sector is generally seen as having the potential to create many jobs, due to a large unemployed workforce and labour cost advantages, with a semi-skilled workforce that already informally works in the apparel industry, along with the climatic and soil conditions to establish a competitive cotton supply. Another sector that is expected to grow and create job opportunities in Ethiopia is the leather garments and shoe sector. This sector is even more labour intensive and the quality of the leather already produced in Ethiopia is among the best in the world.

Table 11: Trends in employment in Ethiopia (% of total manufacturing employment)											
Sector	2000 /01	2001 /02	2002 /03	2003 /04	2004 /05	2005 /06	2006 /07	2007 /08	2008 /09	2009 /10	2010 /11
Food and beverages	29.1	25.4	30.1	29.8	29.0	30.1	28.6	31.3	30.2	32.5	38.7
Non-metallic minerals	8.0	8.4	7.7	8.7	8.3	8.5	8.9	12.8	13.3	10.5	9.9
Tanning and leather	7.5	6.8	7.1	7.3	7.2	6.7	6.7	6.5	5.9	5.8	8.1
Textiles	25.8	22.6	21.6	21.7	19.0	18.7	17.4	9.2	12.1	11.6	7.7
Rubber and plastic	3.6	4.4	4.4	4.2	5.2	5.8	6.1	6.6	8.0	7.5	6.3
Paper and printing	5.9	6.2	6.3	6.6	6.9	6.8	6.6	6.8	5.9	5.4	5.8
Chemicals	4.3	5.1	5.0	4.8	5.5	4.8	5.6	5.9	5.4	6.0	5.6
Furniture	4.6	5.4	5.0	4.9	8.0	4.8	4.6	5.4	5.3	4.5	3.7
Fabricated metal products	2.8	2.8	3.4	3.3	3.5	4.9	2.8	3.9	4.0	5.4	3.5
Apparel	4.0	3.8	4.2	3.6	2.4	3.5	6.1	5.8	5.2	5.0	3.3
Basic iron and steel	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.5	1.0	1.1	2.2	2.8
Wood products	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.6	2.4	1.4	1.8	2.3
Vehicles	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	2.5	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.9
Tobacco	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.8	0.5	0.8
Machinery and equipment	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Source: adapted from CSA, ADBG (2014: 14)											

Building and construction

Building and construction will be a further job market for young and low-skilled labourers. As one can expect that the building boom and investments in material infrastructure all over sub-Saharan Africa will continue for some time, this sector can provide job opportunities in and around the big cities as well as in the rural areas. On the other hand, the building and construction sector are extremely dependent on general economic fluctuations, as well as on political trends and the priorities of development cooperation.

In general, the gap between a growing demand of skilled and highly skilled people and the supply of low or unskilled workers will still remain over the next decades. However, the integration of low skilled workers into light manufacturing can be expected to provide training on the job and thus gradually better skills. Some authors suggest that the transformations in China can open opportunities for some 85 million jobs in light manufacturing when labour costs in China rise.

4.3 Rural-rural migration and work opportunities in rural areas

Cities in sub-Saharan Africa will further grow in the coming decades and smaller settlements will develop into small and medium-sized cities. Migration will still be one of the drivers of urbanisation in Africa, and the trend to migrate into smaller cities will continue.

4.3.1 Rural labour markets and location

Although many rural areas have an abundance of natural capital, location and distance will still matter in the future. Centrality, proximity and access to markets and consumers are vital preconditions for a market oriented agriculture and related activities in areas characterized by large distances and high transport costs. That means that remote rural areas in Africa will most probably not be the hubs of rural job opportunities. The diversity of urban agglomerations is mirrored in the diversity of rural locations. Natural, social and cultural resources differ between rural areas and are constantly subject to natural or human-induced changes.

Table 12: Most likely activities in rural areas according to location and natural resources			
Quality of natural resources	Peri-urban areas	More accessible rural areas	Remote rural areas
Good	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Market gardening and dairying Commuting to the city Weekend recreation activities Manufacturing industry may relocate to areas with lower land prices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arable farming & livestock production, forestry, fishing, mining, quarrying producing surpluses for the market Tourism & recreation Crafts By-employment in rural industry Trade Migration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Subsistence farming, with only the production of surpluses of high value items that can bear transport costs Crafts & services for local markets Tourism & recreation Migration
Poor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Market gardening and dairying (Poor quality of natural resources can be augmented e.g. by irrigation, fertiliser – when needed for intensive farming) Poultry breeding Commuting to the city Weekend recreation activities Manufacturing industry may relocate to areas with lower land prices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extensive farming, probably livestock. Tourism & recreation Crafts Migration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Subsistence farming, low productivity Surpluses very small or nil Crafts & services for local markets Tourism & recreation Migration
Source: adapted from Wiggins and Proctor (2001)			

A number of countries, including Morocco, have invested in small scale agricultural intensification with the aim of making agriculture more attractive by supporting smallholders with fertilizer, knowledge and new plant varieties ("Plan Maroc Vert"). At the same time, modern infrastructure is being built, which makes the products exportable. Investments have been made in small, modern olive oil factories or facilities for processing dates.

Another opportunity for small and middle scale agriculture is the trend towards so-called orphan crops (also: underutilized crops, lost crops of Africa), which are generally better adapted to soil and climatic conditions in Africa and are more resistant against pests and diseases than the major crops worldwide. In many cases, the different varieties of orphan crops have been retained in the remote rural areas and the farmers there have more knowledge on the cultivation and special characteristics. Many of these plants are said to have high nutritional values. With the emergence of an African urban middle class who wants to consume local products and at the same time a global trend to so-called "superfoods", remote rural areas might have a chance to produce high value products which are competitive on the world health market.

4.3.2 Growth corridors and large scale investments

The emergence of new agglomerations alongside major transport corridors can be expected. The Growth Corridor Initiative in sub-Saharan Africa will – if fully implemented – lead to massive investments in transport infrastructure. The "corridor" approach has gained major significance over the past ten years as an economic development strategy in sub-Saharan Africa. Natural resource based industries – such as agriculture and mining – should develop along these corridors. This initiative seeks to reduce transport costs and link industries with local businesses.

The upgrading and new construction of feeder roads, the upgrading of the TAZARA Railway line, and a new bulk terminal at the Port of Dar es Salaam will also affect land locked countries like Zambia. Ethiopia is integrated into the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor, which is planned to give Ethiopia access to shipping facilities and should ease the export of bulky produce but also connect Ethiopia better to an East African domestic market.


Along with the expansion of infrastructure, an increase of large scale land acquisitions (LSLA) can be expected. While in the beginning of the new millennium, biofuel production was at the centre of large scale investments in Africa, the food price crises induced more investments in large scale food production. As a third wave a "bio-economy" is emerging whereby bio-based materials are to substitute those based on fossil fuels (Brüntrup, 2014: 89). A heated debate is going on about the impacts of LSLA, highlighting the negative effects on small scale farmers. However, Michael Brüntrup (2014: 90) argues that "(...) none of the new investments since the food price crisis has already its full production capacity (...)" and he concludes that at the present time a complete assessment of the outcome on rural economies and communities is not possible. Generally, land is mainly leased with long leasing contracts and not sold, and depending on the crops produced, small-scale farmers can negotiate contract farming modalities. However, this is only possible for the local population, but not for migrants. With regard to contracts, they are mostly excluded and will be forced to migrate again. LSLA investments are said not to create enough jobs for the rural (mainly unskilled) population who in turn then are forced to leave their home as they no longer have rights to work the land. Taking a closer look at the periods such LSLA undergo until

they are fully set up and in production, one will see that under the current conditions the investment and establishment phase can take years, during which time only a small number of unskilled agricultural workers are needed. There is a very crucial time gap between occupation of the land by companies and the loss of land for farmers while other opportunities – be it as paid farm workers or as out growers – are not developed. And this is also the time when people will start to migrate, either to more remote rural areas where land is available or – mainly the young – into the cities.

But, as Vāth (2013: 30) argues in her study on Ghana: “With regard to the loss of land, all groups are differently affected, since not all had their farm plots on the concession. Nevertheless, people from the poorest group were most seriously affected, as they cultivated fewer farm plots in total making them therefore more likely to lose all they had at once. (...) compensations were insufficient to restore livelihood, thus, the group of vulnerable people, who lost the little land they had, seems to be worse-off. While for some, the compensation was only sufficient to settle debts (...) and to further their children’s education, others were able to rebuild houses and some could invest in productive assets like cars. (...) the average group mainly emphasizes the pros like employment creation and improved infrastructural endowments. (...) The poorer group seems to benefit least from the positive effects and suffers disproportionately from the burdens, while the better-off group highlights pros and cons. (...). In this case, the anyway marginalized groups had been further marginalized through the loss of their farming plots and insufficient compensations while at the same time jobs have not been created.”

Brüntrup et al. summarize the possible impacts during the investment stage as predominantly negative for the local population which by far outweighed the positive impact of short-term employment before large scale production could start:

“Firstly, negative impacts from land redistribution especially occurred where families were left with no or less fertile land. (...) Secondly, some interviewees criticized reduced access to social infrastructure, e.g. where schools had to be destroyed and were rebuilt further away, or where travel increased due to the need to circumnavigate big connected plots of land by the investor. A third detrimental effect claimed relates to uncertainty about the future. Explicitly mentioned was e.g. the fear that more land might be taken in the future, especially where a clear flow of information from the investor was lacking and trust in the investor was low. (...). Investment-related labour migration starting in the investment stage took place in most cases. Especially for medium and high-level positions, investors stressed the need for more skilled and experienced staff than could be found locally. In contrast, labour migration was often regarded sceptically by the local communities, as they complained about regional discrimination and favouritism, and sometimes blamed labour migrants for a higher incidence of diseases such as HIV/AIDS” (Brüntrup et al., 2016: 15). The same authors argue that when the investment stage is overcome, and the operation state of large scale farming is in full swing, “Employment creation and benefits resulting from services or infrastructure provided by the investor represent the most substantial positive impacts of LSAs on local communities. In almost all cases, investors’ activities were closely related to improved job opportunities and ultimately increased income for (at least parts of) the surrounding communities, sometimes facilitating higher savings and spending on e.g. education and health care” (Brüntrup et al., 2016: 15).



agriculture, mining, logging, and/or illegal activities like charcoal production for a growing urban and peri-urban population.

For an overview of impacts in the different stages of large-scale agricultural investments see Table 12.

The emergence of new agglomerations alongside major transport corridors can be expected. The Growth Corridor Initiative in sub-Saharan Africa will – if fully implemented – lead to massive investments in transport infrastructure. Along with the expansion of infrastructure an increase of large scale land acquisitions can be expected.

Migration by landless or non-local farmers toward the hubs of infrastructure in search of non-agricultural economic activities or towards commercial farms is very likely. For some time, work will be available in the building and construction sector alongside the corridors and will attract migrants mainly from the rural hinterland. However, smallholders who are near enough to the corridor could profit from easier market access and the possibility to grow and sell more specialised products, e.g. specialised tree crops or vegetables. Also, local traders can contribute to the creation of non-farm jobs through the local processing of agricultural produce. Better access to market infrastructure can also help to market fresh produce like fish. But corridors and other infrastructure also facilitates migration into more remote areas for agriculture, mining, logging, and/or illegal activities like charcoal production for a growing urban and peri-urban population.

Table 13: Stages and impacts of large-scale agricultural investment

	Planning (up to contract and land acquisition)	Investment (up to commercial production)	Operation (towards full capacity)	Post-Investment (failure or transfer)
Institutional Framework: Policies Regulations Politics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Land/water/ energy legislation Agricultural policies and initiatives Investment regulations (incl. taxes and fees) International standards&law Local (social and political) dynamics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Land and water legislation International standards and law Taxes and fees Legal provisions on social protection and labour Local (social and political) dynamics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Land and water legislation International standards and law Taxes and fees Legal Provisions on Social Protection and Labour Trade Policy Local (social and political) dynamics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Land and water legislation → land redistribution Provisions for contractual transfer of land Political dynamics contributing to the end/failure External shocks
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feasibility studies Valuation of land Social and environmental impact assessments Information and consultations Negotiations about compensation Dispute resolution in planning Financial planning Negotiations with ministries, donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expropriation, eviction, resettlement Disbursement of compensation Clearing of land Construction of infrastructure Dispute resolution Resistance, sabotage Monitoring 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Production and processing Job creation and training Subcontracting Provision of inputs, credit and technology Construction of infrastructure Corporate Social Responsibility activities Resistance, sabotage Monitoring Dispute resolution, renegotiations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Redistribution of land Transfer of land to new investor Termination or continuation of contracts with local populations Dispute resolution
Impacts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential violation of human rights principles Potential insecurity in local communities Potential of conflicts Creation of expectations (various actors) Risk of corruption and bribery Social capital formation, alliances Rising land prices 	<p>Social Effects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential human rights violations Potential loss of social and economic safety nets Potential changes in local agricultural (food) markets Potential changes in food security Potential of conflicts Migration Inequalities, social dynamics <p>Economic effects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential changes of access to water and land, migration corridors (pastoralists) Short-term employment effects (in e.g. construction, clearing) <p>Environmental effects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Changes in availability/quality of water Potential loss of (agro-)biodiversity Deforestation, erosion, etc. 	<p>Social Effects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Change in living standards Change in access to health and education Changes in food security Migration Potential of conflicts <p>Economic Effects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential rise in employment and income of different stakeholders Potential value chain development Potential cluster effects, spill-overs Potential local economic growth Changes in local agricultural (food) markets <p>Environmental effects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Changes in availability/quality of water Potential loss of (agro-)biodiversity Deforestation, erosion, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Varying social, economic and environmental effects depending on the post-investment provisions and procedures

Source: Brüntrup et al. (2016: 9)

4.4 Summary

Rapid urbanisation has not been accompanied by a corresponding creation of formal employment. Despite average GDP growth rates of around 5% over the past 15 years, the proportion of the labour force in vulnerable employment dropped by only 2% between 2000 and 2015. Especially the service sector increased, and here self-employment or own-account work.

The private sector in Africa is divided into two parts: small and medium enterprises which often operate in the informal sector and comparatively few very large firms that are often foreign owned with access to international markets. Middle sized firms are rare, indicating to constraints in the transition from small scale informal to middle size formal enterprises. Insufficient accounting and management skills among entrepreneurs, administrative obstacles, and a lack of credit facilities are among the reasons why middle sized firms could not break into the market.

As formal employment is becoming increasingly hard to find, and is not seen as being very lucrative, young people are increasingly setting up their own business as the best way to achieve economic security. The vast majority of these businesses are in the informal trading branch, followed by providing services, while only a small proportion are in manufacturing.

The growing internal and external mobility in sub-Saharan Africa (and with it urbanisation) will only lead to gains in combination with paid jobs and livelihood opportunities for incoming residents as well as a just distribution of infrastructure and basic services. Sub-Saharan Africa's investment priorities in material infrastructure, mainly transport, are in danger of perpetuating existing inequalities by cementing uneven access to livelihood chances.

Opportunities for low skilled migrants are to be found in growing post-farm segments of food value chains (e. g. wholesaling, processing, logistics, warehousing, distribution, retailing, and food stalls). They can benefit from the economic effects of more concentrated urban areas.

Manufacturing subsectors that depend on local inputs are likely to have larger outputs and multiplier effects, especially when they are resource intensive, like food processing, textiles and leather production. Labour intensive jobs in the manufacturing sector which require skills that are not too different from current occupational skills could be a source of more productive employment for the pool of low skilled labour in cities.

The gap between a growing demand of skilled and highly skilled people and the supply of low or un-skilled workers will still remain over the next decades. However, the integration of low skilled workers into light manufacturing can be expected to provide training on the job and thus a gradually better skills. Some authors suggest that the transformations in China can open opportunities for some 85 million jobs in light manufacturing when labour costs in China rise.

Although many rural areas have an abundance of natural capital, location and distance will still matter in the future. Centrality, proximity and access to markets and consumers are vital preconditions for a market oriented agriculture and related activities in areas characterized by large distances and high transport costs.

5 Conclusion

Structural transformation and rapid social change processes are characterizing the development of cities in sub-Saharan Africa. While the share of rural-urban migration as a factor of urban growth in sub-Saharan Africa has decreased, both rural and urban areas will nevertheless see substantial population growth. To care for a growing number of people and to offer them income opportunities which allow for a decent livelihood, the course has to be set now. The emergence of small and medium-sized cities could offer new chances for rural farmers in the vicinity as well as for circular migration between rural and urban areas. New City projects could create jobs in the building and construction industry for a limited time, including for low-skilled workers, and if infrastructure policies are successful they could create an enabling environment for innovation and entrepreneurship. Already today, some cities of sub-Saharan Africa have substantial potential for an extension of the manufacturing and services sectors.

Nevertheless, rural-urban migration and sectoral and spatial diversification of income-production will be the rule rather than the exception for many households in their struggle to survive. Especially the younger generations are vulnerable to un- and underemployment, leaving the majority in informal sector jobs. As the demand for employment already by far exceeds the offers in the cities and towns of sub-Saharan Africa and a substantial change is not likely within the next decade, it is essential that urban and rural areas are regarded together as interacting entities. Investments into agriculture and off-farm rural employment in the countryside are as important as far-seeing planning and investments in sustainable industries in the cities.

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